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ABSTRACT 
A botnet, a set of compromised machines controlled distantly by an attacker, is the basis of 
numerous security threats around the world. Command and Control (C&C) servers are the 
backbone of botnet communications, where the bots and botmaster send reports and attack 
orders to each other, respectively. Botnets are also categorised according to their C&C 
protocols. A Domain Name System (DNS) method known as Fast-Flux Service Network 
(FFSN) is a special type of botnet that has been engaged by bot herders to cover malicious 
botnet activities, and increase the lifetime of malicious servers by quickly changing the IP 
addresses of the domain name over time. Although several methods have been suggested for 
detecting FFSNs domains, nevertheless they have low detection accuracy especially with zero-
day domain, quite a long detection time, and consume high memory storage. In this research we 
propose a new system called Fast Flux Killer System (FFKA) that has the ability to detect “zero-
day” FF-Domains in online mode with an implementation constructed on Adaptive Dynamic 
evolving Spiking Neural Network (ADeSNN) and in an offline mode to enhance the 
classification process which is a novelty in this field. The adaptation includes the initial weight, 
testing criteria, parameters customization, and parameters adjustment. The proposed system is 
expected to detect fast flux domains in online mode with high detection accuracy and low false 
positive and false negative rates respectively. It is also expected to have a high level of 
performance and the proposed system is designed to work for a lifetime with low memory usage. 
Three public datasets are exploited in the experiments to show the effects of the adaptive 
ADeSNN algorithm, two of them conducted on the ADeSNN algorithm itself and the last one 
on the process of detecting fast flux domains. The experiments showed an improved accuracy 
when using the proposed adaptive ADeSNN over the original algorithm. It also achieved a high 
detection accuracy in detecting zero-day fast flux domains that was about (99.54%) in an online 
mode, when using the public fast flux dataset. Finally, the improvements made to the 
performance of the adaptive algorithm are confirmed by the experiments.   
KEYWORDS 
Fast-Flux, Zero-day domain, dynamic evolving spiking neural network, botnet detection.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the definitions of the area of research, the gap in the knowledge, the 
research aim and objectives, the research methodology, the research motivation, the scope of 
the research, and the structure of the thesis.   
 
1.1 Introduction 
Botnets are networks of compromised computers that are controlled remotely by attackers and 
are the basis of numerous security threats, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, 
identity theft, phishing, and spam (Almomani, Obeidat, Alsaedi, Obaida, & Al-Betar, 2015; 
Almomani, Wan, et al., 2013; Barford & Yegneswaran, 2007; Dagon, Gu, & Lee, 2008; Fabian 
& Terzis, 2007; Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery, Kang, & Dagon, 2007; Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, & 
Lee, 2008; Karasaridis, Rexroad, & Hoeflin, 2007; Levy & Arce, 2006; Rajab, Zarfoss, 
Monrose, & Terzis, 2006). Fast flux networks (FFNs) are a special type of botnet being used by 
criminals in the same manner as those used in round robin domain name systems (RRDNSs) 
and content distribution networks (CDNs) to offer high availability and flexibility for their 
malicious websites (Alieyan, Almomani, Manasrah, & Kadhum, 2015). Botnet writers disguise 
their malicious activities and design new tactics and mechanisms to hide their communications. 
One such a method is the IP fast flux, which is a mechanism that frequently changes IP addresses 
corresponding to a unique domain name. Another method is the domain flux, which is a 
mechanism that automatically and periodically generates domain names related to a URL of a 
command and control (C&C) server. The core idea of FFNs is to use bot computers as proxies 
(flux agents) that forward user queries to the backend servers called “motherships.” A recurrent 
and fast change in the IP addresses of proxies is essential to evade detection and a potential shut 
down and to ensure high availability to those backend servers. 
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FFNs are considered to be a new development in the operation and management of spam 
campaigns. Along with campaigns, spammers send thousands of emails that contain interesting 
advertisements of products or services (e.g., pharmaceutical, adult content, and phishing) to 
users’ email inboxes (Al-Duwairi & Al-Hammouri, 2014). These advertisements generally 
contain hyperlinks to malicious websites for the campaigns. Until recently, only a single static 
IP address is related to a website for a certain period of time; such a characteristic provides the 
security defenders the chance to take down that website. According to FFNs, a domain name of 
a malicious website points to more than one IP address (FF-agents), which is frequently and 
rapidly changing.  
According to Kalige, Burkey, and Director (2012), HTTP botnets are considered dangerous 
because they attack and exploit systems. Current HTTP botnets use the strongest techniques to 
perform attacks. An example is the Asprox botnet, which has affected about 3.5 billions 
computers in the United States. The Asprox botnet uses an advanced double fast flux, called the 
hydra fast flux, as its main technique (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012). This technique renders 
efforts to take down and defeat C&C servers useless. Additional details are presented in 
Subsection 2.3. 
The report of the Cost of Cyber-Crime Study (Enterprise, 2015) points out that the mean 
annualized cost of cyber-attacks for 252 benchmarked organizations is $7.7 million/year. The 
report also shows that these attacks are carried out with or supported by either a botnet or a web-
based attack, and fast flux is used as an evasion technique to provide availability and resilience. 
The report mentions that the most dangerous cyber-crimes are those caused by denial of services 
(DoS) and web-based attacks. The fast flux evasion technique has been widely used in botnets 
and web-based botnets to carry out DoS and others attacks (e.g., phishing and spam), with fast 
flux serving as the backbone C&C communication between the compromised computers and 
the mothership/malicious website. 
Cyber-criminals have stolen around $78 million through various means using financial malware 
(Marcus, 2012). In addition, McAfee stated that previous fraud cases in Eastern Europe could 
be attributed to Zeus and SpyEye activities; after tracing some of these attacks, they found a 
highly complex fast flux botnet, as well as hidden compromised servers supporting the 
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website’s long life (Marcus, 2012). Botnets are also responsible for spam e-mails. Spammers 
earn an average annual income of $50,000 to $100,000 (Su & Tsai, 2012). Fake online 
pharmacies are one of the many illegal activities available on the Internet; such activities are 
notorious for selling fake or inefficient medications and are involved in identity theft cases 
(Spamwiki, Online). A report from the Fortinet Global Cyber Security Research Team states 
that the fast flux technique has been used in fake Canadian online pharmacies to avoid detection 
(Pharmacy, Online). Security researchers have recently reported that a new variation of the 
“Gameover ZeuS” botnet makes use of the fast flux technique to protect its C&C servers (Inc, 
Online). 
One of the core problems in botnet detection is the so-called unknown “zero-day” fast flux 
domain. Zero-day domains are defined as those related to bots (FF-agents) that are not 
blacklisted (Lin, Lin, & Chiang, 2013). A fast flux attack is a complex evasive technique that 
cannot be identified by many current techniques because attackers can use new and previously 
unseen bots. A number of potential solutions to fast flux botnet attacks have been proposed, but 
these solutions are not yet effective. These solutions range from passive, to active, to real-time 
approaches. The misclassification of malicious and legitimate domains increases with time, 
especially when dealing with unknown zero-day fast flux botnet domains. The proposed 
approach exploited the adaptive DeSNN to detect these zero-day fast flux domains, experiments 
are conducted to compare and show the improvement of adaptation made on the DeSNN 
algorithm on the performance of the algorithm itself, and on the process of detecting FF 
domains. Furthermore, other improvements are made on the adaptive algorithm to enhance the 
testing criteria, as well as making a contribution in the field of parameters customization.  
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. A research problem is provided in subsection 
1.2. The research motivation is detailed in subsection 1.3. Research aim and objectives are 
discussed in subsection 1.4. Research methodology is discussed in subsection 1.5. Subsection 
1.6 shows the contribution of the research. The scope of the research is presented in subsection 
1.7 Finally, the thesis structure is shown in subsection1.8. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
There is a myriad of security threats that are caused by botnets, such as distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, identity theft, and spam (Barford & Yegneswaran, 2007; Dagon et al., 
2008; Fabian & Terzis, 2007; Grizzard et al., 2007; Gu et al., 2008; Karasaridis et al., 2007; 
Levy & Arce, 2006; Rajab et al., 2006). Referring to the FBI’s report of the “Operation Bot 
Roast” project, more than a million IP addresses belonging to normal users had been identified 
on the Internet, while the number continuously increases. Other statistics display that botnets 
generate large revenues for bot herders. Gartner estimated that the economic loss generated 
solely by phishing attacks is about 3 billion US dollars per year (Hsu, Huang, & Chen, 2010). 
Fast-Flux Service Networks (FFSN) are the core of certain botnet types and play the role of 
command and control carrier between the mothership and its bots. Fast-flux networks forward 
and host a scam service to provide a website (back-end server) with high availability, which 
helps them avoid being tracked and shut down by security professionals (Qassrawi & Zhang, 
2012). Risks analytics report from 2016 identified that 84 percent of the campaigns analyzed in 
Ukraine, host a fast flux proxy infrastructure (Doborjeh & Kasabov, 2016). An attacker earns 
many benefits from the botnet fast flux techniques (Otgonbold, 2014). The first benefit is 
simplicity; the attacker can use just a few powerful back-end servers as motherships. FF-agents 
can also add an extra layer of protection against tracking and discovery. Finally, the extra layer 
of protection of these FF-agents extends the life span of the motherships.  
 
The 2018 internet security threat report by Symantec was still very much concerned with 
redirecting the resolution of the DNS responses and the IPs to malicious websites (Semantec, 
2018). Due to fast flux service networks, the biggest problem is distinguishing between 
malicious and benign FFSNs. Looking back to the related work, many researches have tried to 
differentiate between benign and malicious FFSNs, but they still need to increase the true 
positive (TP) and true negative (TN), while also trying to achieve an acceptable and accurate 
ratio of the classification of benign and malicious FFSNs (Martinez-Bea, Castillo-Perez, & 
Garcia-Alfaro, 2013; Perdisci, Corona, Dagon, & Wenke, 2009; Qassrawi & Zhang, 2012). 
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Passive, active, and real time approaches are used in fast flux botnet detection. According to 
Al-Duwairi and Al-Hammouri (2014), the main drawback of the passive approach is the need 
to deal with a huge amount of DNS traffic traces that correspond to legitimate and non-
legitimate domain names. In contrast, the active detection-based approaches deal with less DNS 
traffic traces that correspond to non-legitimate domain names in most cases. Finally, the real-
time approaches suffer from high FP and FN rates. Besides, none of the previously mentioned 
approaches helped to detect zero-day malicious domains and FFSN while simultaneously 
keeping track of the detection accuracy and the time required to detect such a botnet fast flux 
domain. 
From the algorithmic point of view, many researchers have indicated that the DeSNN algorithm 
is one of the eSNN algorithms that has numerous features such as speed, which helps in 
detecting zero-day fast flux domains in a reasonable period (Hagras, Pounds-Cornish, Colley, 
Callaghan, & Clarke, 2004; Kasabov, Dhoble, Nuntalid, & Indiveri, 2013; Nuntalid, Dhoble, & 
Kasabov, 2011; Schliebs & Kasabov, 2013). However, the DeSNN algorithm suffers from the 
fact that several parameters must be set before running the algorithm. Contributing to this 
disadvantage, the sub-process of setting the initial weight of the spiking neural network based 
on the Rank Order (RO) may lead to the misclassification of incoming inputs. Besides, 
determining the best chosen value for the parameters is a significant problem.   
Overall, the problems that are explored and solved in the current thesis are: 
 How to adapt the DeSNN algorithm to improve the classification performance. 
 How to detect the fast flux domains in online mode using the adaptive DeSNN 
algorithm. 
 How to choose a feature set that maximizes the classification performance. 
 How to improve the testing criteria of the DeSNN. 
 How to minimize the number of DeSNN parameters. 
 How to minimize the memory storage used. 
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1.3 Research Motivation: 
The detection of botnet fast flux zero-day domains that are not caught by existing methods is a 
significant challenge. This challenge motivated the proposal of a new methodology which 
would be able to detect the unknown “zero-day” fast flux domains in an online mode. Further 
motivations include: 
 The enhanced robustness of malicious websites. Fast flux assistance attackers keep their 
sites active as long as possible using victim machines. 
 There is an increasing interest in adaptive auto-learning approaches as an effective 
technology in Internet security, which can be applied to distinguish between malicious 
and legitimate domains in online mode and high speed. 
 The availability of a suitable online approach which is applicable to work in the real 
world for a lifetime with small memory usage.  
 The classification process of DeSNN needs to be modified to help in minimizing the 
damages made by fast flux attack. 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of the proposed research is to build a novel approach for fast-flux botnet detection that 
utilizes life-long learning, leads to improve classification performance and various capabilities to 
solve the problem of Fast flux domain detection. To achieve this aim, the following objectives have 
been defined: 
 Develop an approach to solve the problem of Fast-flux service network, especially to detect the 
malicious unknown zero-day FFDN in online mode, with the minimum memory usage. 
 Propose an approach to detect fast-flux domain in online mode using a learning method with a 
minimum number of parameters used in the proposed algorithm. 
 Select the features that will lead to greater accuracy in detecting FF domains. 
 Evaluate the proposed approach by comparing it with existing approaches. 
 Improve the performance and accuracy (reducing FP and FN rates) of the classification by 
changing the weights initialization and the classification criteria. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology defines the stages of how the research will be conducted. So, the 
stages are designated so that each step has a defined set of inputs and the expected output, and 
how the outputs of each stage helps in the next stage. Besides, the feedback from the front stages 
to the back ones will help in the process of modifying the errors and improve the performance 
in order to gain high accuracy or minimize errors. The research methodology employed in this 
research is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1. 1 The Research Methodology 
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The following subsections describe in detail the activities performed during each phase.  
Phase 1 (Literature Review) 
The literature review discusses the currently developed approaches to filter fast flux botnet 
attacks, and outlines the most used techniques in detecting FF attacks. In addition, the literature 
review displays the spiking neural network algorithms and their development to serve the new 
adaptation proposed in this thesis. 
Phase 2 (Literature Analysis) 
This phase evaluates the major approaches against FF attacks, which are classified according to 
the detection method used. This section offers a better understanding of the current problem,  
possible solutions, and the scope of future studies to detect FFDs.  
Phase 3 (Design and Modeling) 
This shows the analysis process of a fast flux botnet and how the adaptation of DeSNN 
positively affects the learning performance, which added a value to the proposed approach 
which is dynamically used to detect fast flux domains. Also, this section compares the other 
algorithms used to solve this problem.  
Phase 4 (Performance Evaluation) 
The final phase presents the performance evaluation, the experimental environment of the 
proposed solution, and the dataset used to show the proposed approach’s effectiveness in 
detecting fast flux domains, especially the zero-day domains. Moreover, the accuracy measures 
used to prove the enhancement of the improvements made on the DeSNN algorithm according 
to the proposed adaptations are shown here. 
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1.6 Contributions of the Research 
The main contribution of this thesis is to develop a novel approach called Fast Flux Killer 
Approach (FFKA), which adapts DeSNN algorithm. This approach has many sub-contributions 
in the field of fast flux domains detection and are be summarized as follows.  
 Increase the detection performance using the adaptive fast one-pass algorithm (ADeSNN). 
Employ the spike time as the initial weight, then the achieved performance is evaluated 
using true positive, true negative, recall, precision, f-Measure and overall accuracy. 
 Improve the detection accuracy, especially the classification criteria by conducting a 
similarity measure between the new and already trained inputs. 
 Design of a new feature set which can be used with the suggested algorithm to accurately 
classify fast flux domains. 
 Introduce a new adaptive dynamic classification threshold in order to classify new 
incoming inputs, as well as minimizing the memory storage used. 
 Adaptive life-long learning approach able to detect dynamically the unknown zero-day fast 
flux domains. 
1.7 The Scope of the Research 
The scope of this work is presented in two tracks. First, this research is about fast flux botnet 
detection aiming to detect those domains in which they behave like malicious fast flux domain. 
Second, this proposed approach is implemented as a host-based approach where it is able to be 
implemented at the local DNS server in order to work as a defender in case of threats and risks.   
1.8 Thesis Structure   
This thesis is divided into 6 chapter where the word developed to achieve the aim and objectives 
of this research is described. The next subsections will summarise each of these chapters.  
Chapter One: 
This chapter gave a brief introduction about fast flux botnets and listed the motivations of the 
researcher to pursue this study. The research problem, research aim, and objectives are also 
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listed here. Finally, this chapter presented the research methodology and the structure of the 
thesis. 
Chapter Two: 
A solid background about different types of fast flux and domain flux are discussed in this 
chapter. A rich literature review of what have been done in the area of fast flux is detailed. The 
author structured this chapter based on the scope of previous methods and solutions that tried 
to solve the problem of fast flux botnet detection. Additionally, the previous work done related 
to the proposed algorithm is mentioned.  Furthermore, some brief information regarding the 
evolving spiking neural network is presented. This information is the foundation of the 
algorithm proposed in this work. 
Chapter Three: 
Part of the proposed solution was the changing of the initial weight. This is discussed in this 
chapter. In addition, the adaptive dynamic evolving spiking neural network and the original 
DeSNN are compared based on two public datasets. The results of the adaptive version with the 
original algorithm are then discussed in details.  
Chapter Four 
Here the first part of the proposed FFKA is introduced, the supervised phase which works 
offline to train the ADeSNN algorithm to detect the fast flux domains based on labelled data. 
Moreover, the testing criteria was introduced to use the similarity measure to classify the fast 
flux domains. This chapter also introduces the classification threshold that will be used in the 
next phase of the FFKA approach in an online mode in chapter five. The chapter concludes by 
a discussion and chapter summary. 
Chapter Five: 
This chapter presents the proposed FFKA approach to detect the zero-day fast flux domains in 
online mode supported by offline mode to enhance the classification performance. Moreover, 
this chapter shows the improvements on the classification process and the parameters 
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customization process and compares the results of the proposed Hybrid FFKA approach with 
the supervised phase in chapter four. The chapter concludes by a discussion and chapter 
summary. 
Chapter Six: 
This chapter give the overall discussion and present the conclusion of the work. In this chapter, 
we state the limitations of this research, recommendations, and the possible future works. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK 
Chapter Overview 
This study covered the literature review regarding the fast flux botnet problem. This chapter is 
organized based on the three solution scope of the literature approaches which they were the 
host-based, router-based, and the DNS-based. Then the related work from the literature was 
discussed. 
 
 
2.1 Background 
Numerous websites provide commercial services to users. The efficiency of these services is 
highly dependent on their availability. Server systems are distributed to large redundant service 
networks in multiple areas to achieve high availability (Scharrenberg, 2008). The DNS is a 
hierarchical distributed naming system for computers and resources that are connected to the 
Internet (Shaikh, Tewari, & Agrawal, 2001). A browser usually automatically acquires the IP 
address of the desired host name to access a website. The DNS server typically returns the same 
reply each time. Thus, the same IP address is returned each time a host name is requested. Some 
requests, such as RRDNSs, CDNs, and fast flux service networks (FFSNs), do not work in the 
same manner as previously described. RRDNSs, CDNs, and FFSNs share similar 
characteristics, such as a low time to live (TTL) feature. RRDNSs and CDNs are DNS-based 
methods for load balancing that provide a high degree of performance, availability, and 
scalability for content websites. RRDNSs distribute user requests to their distributed servers by 
swapping the IP addresses of the DNS response of the same domain each time to provide load 
balancing. CDNs represent a network of globally distributed nodes to return the IP address of 
the nearest accessible node to the client; they thus support service speed and availability. 
Similarly, fast flux uses a similar concept of frequently changing IP addresses that correspond 
to a specific domain. This strategy helps cyber-criminals to remain undetected. The main 
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difference between FFSNs and CDNs is that CDN nodes are fully administered machines, 
whereas FFSNs are malware-infected computers (Lin et al., 2013). 
The business side of fast flux hosting begins with malware authors. By developing phishing 
kits, this software package can be used to deliver phishing emails to a set (list) of victims and 
host an illegal website to which those emails are directed. Others sell lists of addresses for spam 
purposes, whereas others improve Bot software. A flexible, remotely controllable software 
known as bot software enables subsequent downloads on a particular computer once it has been 
installed on a victim’s computer. E-mail-borne worms are used by bot herders to infect and 
exploit thousands of computers. Such tools are the most valued these days by malware authors 
and cyber-criminals. Malware authors and bot herders are significant sections of the cyber-
criminal community (ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), March 
2008). 
FFNs provide high availability and reliability to scam websites ("GNSO Fast Flux Hosting 
Working Group Publishes Final Report," 7 August 2009). The ICCAN report (ICANN Security 
and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), March 2008) defines a fast flux technique as one in 
which multiple IP addresses (sometimes hundreds or even thousands) are assigned and re-
assigned to a single fully qualified domain name (FQDN), such as www.example.com. The 
URLs and domain names for the announced content are not resolved to any IP addresses of 
back-end servers. Instead of pointing to back-end servers, the URLs and domain names 
addresses are changed among many front-end agents, which serve as redirectors; thus, the 
content is forwarded to the back-end servers (the mothership) (Gasster, 2008; "GNSO Fast Flux 
Hosting Working Group Publishes Final Report," 7 August 2009; ICANN Security and Stability 
Advisory Committee (SSAC), March 2008). 
Fast flux mainly involves two techniques, namely, the IP fast flux and the domain flux. The IP 
fast flux comes in two types as depicted in Figure 2.1: the single fast flux and the double fast 
flux. An extension type of the double flux is called the hydra flux (Subsection 2.1.3). The details 
of these techniques are discussed in the subsections that follow. 
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Figure 2. 1 Comparison of IP resolutions of fast flux techniques 
 
2.1.1 Single Fast Flux 
Domain names are registered in an official registrar by an attacker for use in illegal activities 
by an official registrar. The attacker registers a domain name for an FFSN referring to illegal 
websites (e.g., bad.com) and another domain name (Resolvernameserver.com) to serve the 
mapping domain name resolution services. As mentioned previously, the attacker adds IP 
addresses to the bulletproof server and then provides the control of the FFSN to a mothership. 
In a single fast flux as displayed in Figure 2.2, the attacker deploys a bulletproof server to host 
the zone file. The bulletproof web hosting server leads customers to the desired malicious 
website. Such services are well-known among botnet owners, who need a reliable environment, 
and assist in deploying a botnet C&C server. 
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Figure 2. 2 Single fast flux of IP addresses of a malicious website 
Figure 2.2 shows the process of a single fast flux of the IP addresses of a malicious website. 
1. The attacker recruits some of the compromised computers to work as proxies, which directly 
redirect user requests to the mothership/operator. 
2. The attacker adds the name server (Resolvernameserver.com) and records of the malicious 
website (www.bad.com/mothership) to the zone file via the registrar. 
3. The victim (user) requests the FQDN (www.bad.com). Hence, a request is sent to the DNS 
looking to resolve the FQDN. Assuming the absence of caching, a recursive DNS server asks 
for the authoritative name server for this FQDN. The part of the recursive process from the top-
level domain (TLD) to the authoritative server is omitted. 
4. Instead of sending the IP address of the FQDN (www.bad.com), the authoritative name server 
sends back a list of the IP addresses of the proxies to the user. 
5. The user initiates a GET message to one of the IP addresses in the list. 
6. The FF-agent (proxy) simply redirects the message to the malicious web server (the mothership) 
to handle the message. 
7. The malicious web server sends the response (answer) back to the FF-proxy. 
8. The FF-agent returns the response to the user. 
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The A records of the web servers are constructed with short TTLs (Holz, Gorecki, Rieck, & 
Freiling, 2008), “A” is the resolved record information returned from DNS. The FFSN operators 
directly provide a new set of A records to replace the old set of records (of the FF-agents) when 
the TTLs of the request expire. Thus, there is very little chance of identifying and shutting down 
the web servers, which are supported by this FF technique. The records associated with the 
illegal website in the zone file of the DNS bot (Resolvernameserver.com) might appear as 
follows: 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 192.10.10.1 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 50.74.0.12 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 100.7.10.1 
The TTL for each RR is clearly very low (180 s). The RRs are directly replaced with new bot 
(FF-agents) IP addresses when the TTL expires. The zone file might be read as follows after a 
time of TTL+1: 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 155.1.1.14 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 180.88.0.9 
              bad.com. 180 IN A 120.1.1.2 
2.1.2 Double Fast Flux 
Furthermore, the fast flux mothership/operator identifies the abovementioned domains, which 
correspond to its FFSN. The FF-agents in the two FFSNs are separated to simplify the 
understanding of the idea behind the double fast flux because FF-agents are commonly used to 
serve both DNS and HTTP requests at the same time (Xu, Wang, & Xie, 2013) as the 
mothership/operator. Figure 2.3 shows the double fast flux process. 
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Figure 2. 3 Double FFSN of name server and IP addresses of the malicious website 
Figure 2.3 summarizes the double fast flux process of the IP addresses of the malicious website 
and the authoritative name server. 
1. The attacker recruits some of the compromised computers to work as proxies, which directly 
redirect the user request to the FF mothership/operator. 
2. The attacker recruits some of the compromised computers to work as NS proxies, which directly 
redirect the DNS request to the mothership/operator. 
3. The attacker adds the name server records (Resolvernameserver.com) to the TLD zone file via 
the registrar and keeps updating the legitimate DNS RR of the authoritative name servers of the 
malicious domain. 
4. The victim (user) sends a request for (www.bad.com) to the DNS server to resolve the FQDN. 
5. The DNS returns a list of authoritative name servers for this FQDN, which are a part of the 
malicious compromised pool of NS agents. 
6. The user sends the authoritative NS asking for the IP address of the FQDN. 
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7. The authoritative name server forwards the DNS request to the mothership instead of resolving 
and directly returning the IP address of the FQDN. 
8. The mothership returns a list of IP addresses that are FF-agent proxies of the website server 
(mothership). 
9. The authoritative name server sends the IP addresses back to the user. 
10. The user initiates a GET message to one of the IP addresses in the list (which is actually one of 
the FF-agents). 
11. The FF-agent (proxy) simply redirects the message to the malicious web server (mothership) to 
handle the message. 
12. The malicious web server sends the response back to the FF-agent. 
13. The FF-agent returns the response to the user. 
 
The attacker continuously updates the NS records of the TLD. Through the registrar, the domain 
owner has the ability to modify the domain information. The attacker frequently changes the IP 
addresses of the NS servers to point to different hosts and sets the TTL value for these NS 
servers to a very small value (e.g., 180 s). The RRs of the NS might be shown in a TLD zone 
file as follows: 
bad.com. NS NS1.Resolvernameserver.com 
bad.com. NS NS2.Resolvernameserver.com 
NS1.Resolvernameserver.com A 11.11.11.11 
NS2.Resolvernameserver.com A 10.0.0.2 
The attacker automatically replaces the A records of the NS when the TTL expires. Therefore, 
the RRs of the NS might be shown in a TLD zone file as follows: 
bad.com. NS NS1.Resolvernameserver.com 
bad.com. NS NS2.Resolvernameserver.com 
NS1.Resolvernameserver.com. A 22.22.22.22 
NS2.Resolvernameserver.com. A 10.10.10.233 
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Consequently, there is very little opportunity to detect and shut down the name servers that 
support this fast flux attack. Combining the two FFSNs is an effective method for keeping the 
website alive for longer periods than websites that do not use the same techniques. 
2.1.3 Hydra Fast Flux 
The new advanced FFSN does the same thing as the traditional FFSN, but taking it down is 
impossible. Similar to the traditional FFSN, the mothership of the new advanced FFSN can be 
deactivated by law enforcement, but the bots have an alternative IP address to another 
mothership related to the same FFSN. As depicted in figure 2.4 the Asprox botnet, the bots 
download a list of available motherships. Ultimately, alternative IP addresses adds a multilayer 
of double fast flux to the botnet and maintains extra availability to the malicious content. Figure 
2.4 depicts the multilayer FFSN of the Asprox botnet, which is usually denoted as a hydra-flux 
service network. 
FFSN
FFSN
botbot bot bot bot
Asprox C&C Servers
bot
Mothership A Mothership B Mothership C
Hydra-Flux 
Service network
 
Figure 2. 4 Multilayer FFSN of the Asprox botnet and hydra-flux service network 
2.1.4 Domain Flux 
Another type of fluxing technique is the domain flux. In contrast to the fast flux of the IP 
addresses related to a domain name, the domain flux is the process of fluxing domain names 
related to a URL of the C&C server. 
21 
 
The domain flux is used by bots to contact the C&C server. The domain generating algorithm 
generates the same domain names for both the C&C server and its bots when seeded with the 
same value. The C&C server is used to register some of the auto-generated domains. Stone-
Gross et al. (2009) revealed that the Torpig botnet calculates domain names by combining the 
current week and year and adding the TLD (e.g., “weekyear.net”) to them. These auto-generated 
domains are then used by bots to contact the C&C server; if the connection fails, then the bots 
attempt to use the day information to produce the daily domains. If all the domains fail, then the 
bots use the hard-coded domain names in their configuration file as a last resort (Stone-Gross 
et al., 2009). All of these generated domain names are sent to the DNS server in an attempt to 
resolve it. The bots then establish contact with the C&C server. This process of failed requests 
generates a high observable number of non-existing domain responses in the DNS traffic that 
create a footprint of these bots that send most of the failed DNS requests (Jiang, Cao, Jin, Li, & 
Zhang, 2010; Pappas et al., 2009; S. Yu, 2014). 
2.2 Literature Review 
Numerous studies have explored botnet detection, especially fast flux botnet detection (Al-
Duwairi & Al-Hammouri, 2014; Chahal & Khurana, 2016; Z. Chen, Wang, Zhou, & Li, 2011; 
Scharrenberg, 2008; Yu, Zhang, Kang, & Chen, 2012). Most previous researches discussed the 
detection of FFSNs or malicious fast flux domains, which serve as the main element of the fast 
flux botnet technique. The related works on fast flux argued about fast flux in terms of what is 
fluxed or what technique is used to detect an FF domain. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
the present study is the first to investigate fast flux botnet approaches on the basis of the solution 
scope of detection techniques as depicted in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2. 5 Solution scope of FF botnet detection methods 
Figure 2. 5 presents the solution scope of fast flux botnet detection. In addition, the current 
study classifies fast flux botnet approaches according to the solution scope. Hence, number 1 in 
Figure 2.5 refers to host-based methods, number 2 refers to router-based methods, and number 
3 refers to DNS-based methods. Moreover, the current study discusses the mode of each 
detection technique and identifies whether it is active, passive, or real time as depicted in Figure 
2. 6. Within these parts, each approach discusses the features, the datasets, and the classifier 
used.  
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2.2.1 Host-based Detection Methods 
Host-based means that the proposed approach is applied to a host device or a set of devices from 
the user point of view. According to the literature, the majority of the reported works were using 
the host-based detection approach.  These approaches are divided into three subgroups: passive, 
active, and real-time approaches. 
2.2.1.1 Passive Host-based Approaches 
The idea behind passive approaches is that they rely on the monitoring part of a specific network 
area for a period of time. The collected data are then analyzed to prove predefined propositions. 
Passive monitoring provides the detection methods the advantage of not being noticed by 
attackers and adds no extra traffic flows to the network. 
A Bayesian method is proposed to detect bots on the basis of DNS traffic similarity (Villamarín-
Salomón & Brustoloni, 2009). The proposed approach relies on the idea that a bot at the same 
botnet has the same traffic similarity as the other botnets. One bot should be known at the 
beginning; then, the search for other bots with the same traffic similarities in the DNS traffic is 
initiated. However, the poor tuning of parameters generates large false positive (FP) values 
(Villamarín-Salomón & Brustoloni, 2009). 
Another method of using decision trees to identify malicious FFSNs was proposed in (Zhao & 
Traore, 2012). The classifier begins by classifying malicious domains, and then monitors the 
suspicious ones for a longer period. The proposed approach may be able to identify legitimate 
and malicious FFSNs, but it may not easily classify them on the basis of malicious website 
behaviors. The proposed approach is also unable to detect unknown FFSNs, as well as unknown 
zero-day domains. In addition, the author suggested generating a new system that can develop 
its classifier while running on the basis of an existing dataset and newly generated data, which 
would enable the system to identify new threats (Zhao & Traore, 2012). Table 2.1 summarizes 
the passive approaches. 
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Table 2. 1 Summary of passive approaches 
Authors Algorithm Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Zhao and 
Traore (2012) 
Decision 
tree 
Monitoring 
malicious domains 
to detect FFSNs 
Low 
computationa
l complexity 
 -Classification 
problem 
- -Unable to detect 
unknown zero-day 
domains 
Villamarín-
Salomón and 
Brustoloni 
(2009) 
Bayesian 
method 
Detecting bots 
based on DNS 
traffic similarities 
and known bot 
traffic 
Effective and 
robust 
Parameter tuning causes 
FP 
 
Overall, fast flux botnet domains still need to be detected in a short time because of the quick 
change in the IP addresses of motherships that hampers the easy tracking of their locations. 
Thus, detecting this type of “Fast Flux zero-day” domains as quickly as possible is important. 
Moreover, passive approaches deal with a huge amount of data and are thus unsuitable for fast 
processing in a short time with few resources. 
2.2.1.2 Host-based Active Approaches 
In contrast to passive approaches, active approaches require assistance from third-party data 
sources, such as the WHOIS or GeoIP database. Such third parties provide additional necessary 
information (e.g., IP address registrar name and creation data). The following subsections 
describe related works that applied host-based active approaches. 
A) Score-based Approaches 
Many fast flux domain detection approaches are based on the flux score calculation of a set of 
features adopted (Al-Duwairi & Al-Hammouri, 2014; C.-M. Chen, Cheng, & Chou, 2013; Holz 
et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2014; Koo, Chang, & Chuang, 2012; Otgonbold, 2014; Sheng, Shijie, & 
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Sha, 2010). Holz et al. (2008) proposed a system that measures and detects a FFSN on the basis 
of the calculated flux score. Their proposed system takes malicious domains from spam emails 
and then uses the Dig tool to generate DNS lookups and reverse DNS lookups and thereby 
obtain necessary information about a feature set (number of A records, number of autonomous 
system numbers (ASNs), and number of (NS). Thus, the flux score calculation is fed for use 
later in distinguishing between malicious FFSNs and legitimate ones. Their results showed that 
the proposed system achieves a detection accuracy of 99.98%. However, the coefficients used 
in the score calculation require modification to ensure the highest possible accuracy of the 
detection system. Moreover, the set of features chosen cannot purely distinguish between 
FFSNs and CDNs. 
Hsu et al. (2014) proposed a fast flux domain detector (FFDD) system that adds to Holz’s source 
of malicious domains and taking unknown URLs from spam or social networks. The FFDD 
system is used to calculate the flux score on the basis of the response time series between each 
of the two subsequent requests from a host to the FF-agent. The FFDD is a lightweight 
standalone system that does not need support from other parties. Consequently, the FFDD can 
accurately detect a fast flux domain with 3% FP and 2% FN in less than 20 min. Therefore, this 
technique is not suitable for fast flux detection. 
Sheng et al. (2010) proposed two metrics, namely, the average online rate (AOR) and the 
minimum availability rate (MAR) to detect fast flux agents on the basis of the agents 
themselves. The calculations of these two methods are initiated from the beginning of the 
monitoring process. The monitoring is extended for 1 h using the AOR and MAR calculation 
once a malicious domain is detected. The results show that most FFSNs have lower values than 
legitimate ones. Moreover, these methods are easy to implement and deploy and are useful for 
distinguishing between benign and malicious FFSNs but not for FFSN detection. However, the 
metrics may work incorrectly if the group of agents is small or only a few agents are found 
(Sheng et al., 2010). According to Sheng, the metrics depend on the quality of the HTTP service, 
which may affect network accessibility and thus stop reaching agents. 
The Google search engine has also been used as a technique to classify malicious domains by 
feeding the search process with IP addresses of suspicious domains (Al-Duwairi & Al-
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Hammouri, 2014). The number of hits is then observed. As expected, the number of hits 
comprising domains associated with FFSNs would be much less than the number of legitimate 
domains. The new legitimate domain could also mislead the classifier. The proposed system is 
still at its infancy and thus needs other features to confirm its detection accuracy. 
Koo et al. (2012) proposed a computed formula to detect malicious domains being used in 
FFSNs, with the domains obtained from a malware domain list. They explored the actual status 
of FFSNs employed in cyber-crimes and analyzed the distribution of compromised computers. 
Consequently, the detection accuracy is high. However, their data were not sufficient to estimate 
the scope of the FFSN. Thus, their proposed procedure may lead to misclassified domains. 
(Chen et al., 2013) proposed a probability formula to detect malicious fast flux domains. The 
network behavior of malicious domains are formalistic based on the time–space behavior of 
malicious FF-domains. In addition, an analysis was proposed to reduce the time complexity of 
feature modeling. The results of this study show that the proposed solution performs better than 
the blacklists. However, a threshold is still needed to compute the probability formula. 
Moreover, gathering information about domain names requires more time, which affects 
detection performance. 
Otgonbold (2014) proposed a fast flux formula to help detect fast flux domains in the wild. The 
proposed ADAPT system takes inputs from the domain zone file to collect the DNS information 
needed in the detection system. The zone file is targeted because it contains domains scattered 
all around the globe using the Tor network as shown in Figure 2. 7. The system’s clients gather 
suspicious domains from various DNS servers over the Tor network and then analyzes the 
collected information. Thus, the decision is made as to whether the domain needs further 
scanning to confirm its maliciousness. The results of this study indicate that the proposed system 
is capable of detecting malicious fast flux domains in their infancy. However, the RDNS server 
should be queried to collect full DNS information, and such requirement could affect detection 
performance. The current version of Grails also shows a memory leak problem, which causes 
out-of-memory exceptions and long-running tasks. Table 2. 2.2 summarizes the calculated 
score-based approaches. 
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Figure 2. 7 ADAPT system architecture(Otgonbold, 2014) 
 
Table 2. 2 Summary of score-based approaches. 
Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Weakness 
Holz et al. 
(2008) 
Flux score The flux score is 
computed on the basis 
of DNS records 
Uses two 
consecutive DNS 
lookups 
- Coefficients require 
periodic adjustment 
- Feature is not 
distinguishable 
Hsu et al. 
(2014) 
Flux score Fast flux score is 
computed on the basis 
of the response time 
differences of 
subsequent requests of 
FF domains 
Lightweight stand-
alone system 
Long detection time  
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Sheng et 
al. (2010) 
 
AOR, MAR Once the existence of a 
fast flux domain agent is 
discovered, its activities 
are monitored every 
hour using calculations 
based on AOR and 
MAR 
Easy to implement 
and deploy; metrics 
are time saving 
- Inaccurate result 
- Based on the quality 
of the HTTP service 
 
Al-
Duwairi 
and Al-
Hammouri 
(2014) 
Number of 
hits in the 
Google 
search engine 
Depending on the 
number of hits of query 
responses using the 
Google search engine 
Lightweight 
approach 
 
- Still in the 
development phase 
- Needs more features 
to confirm detection 
accuracy 
- Misclassifies new 
domains as malicious 
Koo et al. 
(2012) 
Calculated 
formulas 
Calculated formulas 
based on the actual 
status of the FFSN being 
employed 
High detection 
accuracy 
- Data problem 
- Misclassified 
domains 
Chen et al. 
(2013) 
Probability 
formula 
- Time–space behavior 
of malicious FF 
domains and network 
behavior of domains are 
formulistic 
Outperforms 
blacklists 
- Threshold is needed 
- Long detection time 
Otgonbold 
(Otgonbol
d, 2014) 
Flux score 
formula 
- Detection system 
collects domains from 
DNS zone files 
Detects malicious 
fast flux domains in 
their infancy 
- RDNS servers 
should be queried, 
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- Anonymously 
provides domains all 
around the globe in a 
short period of time with 
little resource using the 
Tor network 
which could affect 
performance 
- Out-of-memory 
exception 
 
B) Machine Learning-based Approaches 
A number of machine learning algorithms are used to classify domains as either malicious or 
benign (Chen, Huang, & Ou, 2014; Passerini, Paleari, Martignoni, & Bruschi, 2008) as 
summarized in Table 2.3. In the naïve Bayes classifier proposed by Passerini et al. (2008), all 
malicious domains are collected from spam emails. Their detection and monitoring “FluXOR” 
system relies on the idea of a host being a victim to such scam. The system begins to send 
requests and gathers the feature set information to feed the naïve Bayes classifier as in Figure 
2. 8. The naïve Bayes classifier is a supervised algorithm, which is not suitable for detecting 
unknown attacks. FluXOR reduces the time of detection to 1–3 h, which is still relatively long; 
a domain with a TTL of more than 3 h is still considered legitimate (Huang, Mao, & Lee, 2010). 
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Figure 2. 8 FLUXOR system deployment(Passerini et al., 2008) 
 
Chen et al. (2014) proposed a Bayesian probability theory to distinguish between benign and 
malicious domains using dissimilar ASNs, reverse DNS lookups, and domain registration time 
features. They aimed to detect a fast flux website on the basis of its fluxed characteristics. The 
result of this proposed system presents its ability to identify possible threats. Nevertheless, their 
judgment was not perfect enough to reflect the good precision of the proposed system. 
Chen et al. (2011) used the k-nearest neighbor (KNN) and random forest (RF) as sampling 
techniques to solve the imbalanced problem, with respect to FFSN detection. In addition, they 
proposed a sampling technique that is combined with feature extraction from datasets for use in 
fast flux detection. The result showed that the TTL is an important feature to the classification 
of the proposed technique. However, its detection accuracy in the case of a long TTL is affected. 
The support vector machine (SVM) was proposed by Yu et al. (2012) to detect fast flux botnets 
by analyzing the patterns of DNS queries from FF botnets. They extracted six features to build 
the weighted SVM classifier for use in distinguishing legitimate and FF botnet domains. They 
noted that using SVM to identify fast flux botnets is effective and provides a satisfactory 
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detection accuracy. Overall, the proposed method entails a long detection time because it waits 
for additional information from a third party. Moreover, such a supervised method is not helpful 
in detecting new and unknown zero-day attacks. 
Table 2. 3 Summary of machine learning approaches. 
Authors Algorithms 
Mechanism 
Advantages Weakness 
Passerini 
et al. 
(2008) 
Naïve 
Bayesian 
classifier 
Analyzes a set of features 
observed from the victim’s 
point of view on botnet 
scams 
Reduces 
detection delay 
- Long detection 
delay 
- Unable to detect 
zero-day domains 
Chen et al. 
(2014) 
Bayesian 
probability 
theory 
Uses different 
characteristics to 
distinguish benign and 
malicious domains 
Enhances 
detection 
accuracy of web-
based botnets 
- Achieves inaccurate 
precision 
 Chen et al. 
(2011) 
KNN and RF Use the resampling 
technique to solve the 
imbalanced classification 
problem with respect to 
FFSN detection 
Solve the 
imbalanced 
dataset problem 
- Long TTL affects 
detection accuracy 
Yu et al. 
(2012) 
Weighted 
SVM 
Extracts six features to the 
weighted SVM by 
analyzing the patterns of 
DNS responses to FFSNs 
Satisfies 
detection 
accuracy 
- Earlier domains 
create FP 
- Unable to detect 
zero-day domains 
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C) Decision Tree-based Approaches 
Celik and Oktug (2013) proposed the C4.5 decision tree algorithm to evaluate various DNS 
feature sets and put forward a detection approach, which is a high-dimensional feature vector 
with various features, including timing network, spatial, and NS and DNS response information. 
C4.5 evaluates each feature set of previous vectors and decides which one is the best feature 
vector on the basis of detection accuracy. Combining all features together provides a detection 
accuracy of 98.9%. However, the detection is unaffected in those timing and domain name 
feature sets. The C4.5 unsupervised algorithm depends on clustering and is good for detecting 
unknown attacks; however, it suffers from a low accuracy level in most applications 
(Almomani, Gupta, Atawneh, Meulenberg, & Almomani, 2013). 
D. Zhao and Traore (2012) proposed another method (REPTree) for botnet detection using a 
decision tree with reduced error pruning. This type of machine learning decision tree is used to 
classify and identify malicious FFSNs by defining and computing some of the network metrics 
captured from network flows. Although decision tree-based classifiers are considered as a well-
known classification technique with low computational complexity, the authors were not sure 
of the results because some benign websites were misclassified as malicious websites. They 
also searched for other reliable evidence. Table 2. 4 summarizes the approaches using the 
decision tree algorithm. 
The classification and regression tree algorithm is used in the method proposed by Y. Zhao and 
Jin (2015). This method uses a small dataset to quickly distinguish legitimate and malicious 
FFSNs. This method is mainly based on FFSN domains, DNS, and the process of HTTP visiting. 
The domain distinct features are shown in Figure 2. 9. Another researcher used distinct mapping 
of features (Pa, Yoshioka, & Matsumoto, 2015). The classification process needs less than a 
few days, and the detection accuracy is 90%. The detection time is also relatively long, and 
other detection methods exhibit higher accuracy and lower detection time. Moreover, this 
method cannot detect zero-day domains. 
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Figure 2. 9 The process of visiting a domain(Y. Zhao & Jin, 2015) 
Table 2. 4 Summary of the approaches using decision tree algorithms. 
Authors Algorithms 
Mechanism 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Celik and 
Oktug 
(2013) 
C4.5 
decision 
tree 
A number of feature 
sets are experimented 
on to detect FFN.  
Detect 
unknown 
attacks 
 
- Unaffected by 
some of feature sets  
- Low level of 
accuracy 
D. Zhao 
and Traore 
(2012) 
Decision 
tree using 
reduced 
error 
pruning 
(REPTree) 
Computed metrics of 
captured network flows 
that are analyzed using 
REPTree. 
Low 
computational 
complexity 
-Misclassification  
-Needs additional 
discriminators 
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Y. Zhao 
and Jin 
(2015) 
 Regression 
tree 
algorithm 
Detect FFSN domains 
on the basis of the 
intrinsic features of 
DNS analysis and the 
process of HTTP 
visiting. 
Ability to 
classify FFSN 
domains  
 
-Long detection 
time 
-Low accuracy rate 
-Unable to detect 
zero- day domains 
 
D) Geo-informational Based Approaches 
A constraint-based geolocation technique was employed in (Castelluccia, Kaafar, Manils, & 
Perito, 2009), and the proposed approach utilizes a geo-localized fast flux hidden server. Thus, 
mean error distance is used in this approach to determine the physical location of the mothership 
server. As a result, their approach localizes the mothership with a mean error of below 100 km. 
However, the system requires extensive resources, achieves low precision, and is incomplete. 
Buhariwala (2011) used the same technique and determined that the 100 km mean error is 
inaccurate; moreover, the result indicated that the right error value is 1,000 km from the 
mothership server. A virtual private proxy server was proposed to decrease the overhead of 
requesting data from the content server. The result indicated a 300 km mean error, which is 
three times better than that obtained by Castelluccia et al. (2009). A large mean error rate for 
physically localizing the mothership server still exists. Table 2. 5 summarizes the methods that 
utilize geo-information. 
The system proposed by Stalmans, Hunter, and Irwin (2012) used Moran’s I and Geary’s C 
features to produce classifiers to detect the fast flux C&C domain names of C2 servers. The 
proposed system can detect domain names on the basis of the geographic locations of C2 
servers. Moran’s I assumes that close geographical C2 servers are similar, whereas Geary’s C 
measures the spatial autocorrelations between C2 servers. Their system can reliably detect FF 
domains with a small FP rate. Moran’s I measurement is influenced by the number of white 
spaces at a large scale (Stalmans et al., 2012).  
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Stornig (2013) employed another approach in which Moran’s I of spatial autocorrelation and 
spatial service distance are used to classify legitimate and non-legitimate fast flux domains. This 
approach is based on the geo-information of the distributed IP addresses of FF-agents. The 
spatial autocorrelation between two distant geographical points means that they are not similar, 
and close points share more similarities. The spatial service distance denotes the average 
distance between the geolocation of the IP addresses that is correlated with the same domain 
and the geolocation of the IP addresses of the name server. As a result, the author was convinced 
that the proposed approach is accurate and lightweight for detecting fast flux domains with low 
FPs. However, botmasters could cause the detection approach to yield to misclassified results 
by changing the distribution of the IP addresses of the agents. 
Table 2. 5 Summary of approaches using geo-information. 
Authors Algorithms 
Mechanism 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Castellucci
a et al. 
(2009) 
Constraint-based 
geolocation 
technique 
Determines the 
physical location of 
the FF mothership 
on the basis of 
network 
measurements 
Can localize 
with a mean 
error distance 
below 100 km 
-Requires extensive 
resources to set up 
-Less precise and 
less complete 
Buhariwal
a (2011) 
Constraint-based 
geolocation 
technique 
Determines the 
physical location of 
the FF mothership 
on the basis of 
network 
measurements 
Decreases the 
overhead of 
requesting 
content servers  
Inaccurate rate (300 
km) 
Stalmans et 
al. (2012) 
Time zone, UTM, 
MGRS 
Identify fast flux 
domains on the sole 
basis of the 
Only a small 
percentage of 
FPs 
Classifier is 
affected by a large 
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geographic 
locations of C2 
servers 
amount of 
whitespace 
Stornig 
(2013) 
 
 
Moran’s I of 
spatial 
autocorrelation 
and spatial 
service distance 
Utilizes methods of 
geo-information 
and spatial statistics 
-Lightweight 
system 
-Avoids FPs 
Could be 
misclassified by 
botmasters 
 
The problem with active detection-based approaches is that they deal with minimal DNS traffic 
traces, which correspond to non-legitimate domain names in most cases. According to the nature 
of active approaches that mostly deal with malicious domains, they are obviously unable to 
detect unknown zero-day domains. 
2.2.1.3 Host-based Real-time Approaches 
The previous methods involve passive and active approaches, which presented many detection 
techniques to detect malicious fast flux botnet domains and FFSNs. Fast flux detection requires 
a fast and accurate approach to identify malicious domains before they change their IP 
addresses. Thus, a new era of real-time approaches have been developed to increase the power 
of detection techniques. The main idea behind employing real-time approaches is to reduce the 
time needed to detect attacks to real-time processing. 
A) Spatial Information-based Approaches 
Caglayan, Toothaker, Drapeau, Burke, and Eaton (2009) were the first to conduct a related 
empirical study. The authors presented a fast flux monitor (FFM) that could detect and classify 
FFSNs in real time within minutes. The FFM comprises active and passive DNS monitors, 
which reduce the long-term observation of FFSNs. Using active and passive monitoring can 
reduce observation duration, but the system still requires a few additional minutes. Obtaining 
extra information from a data center helps classify botnet domain names. 
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Huang et al. (2010) proposed a real-time system called spatial snapshot fast flux detection 
(SSFD). SSFD detects FFSNs by extracting the IP addresses of the hosts (agents) from the DNS 
responses and determining the geographical traffic patterns of these agents in a geographic 
coordinate system. Two spatial measures were used: spatial distribution estimation and spatial 
service relationship evaluation. A Bayesian network classifier was also employed to distinguish 
FFSNs from benign networks. The experimental results indicated that SSFD is effective (less 
than 0.5 s) and yields lower FP rates than flux score detection systems through their data sets. 
However, SSFD suffers from a single IP problem and missing geographical information 
problem, which may cause the system to malfunction. The experiments verify that the detection 
accuracy is 62% (H.-T. Lin et al., 2013). 
A Bayesian network classifier algorithm classifier was proposed by Horng-Tzer, Ching-Hao, 
Kuo-Ping, and Hahn-Ming (2012) to detect FFSNs in real time. The authors believed that the 
grid distribution of the localized spatial-locating capability is ideal to depict the spatial 
relationship between the resolutions of IP addresses. To enhance the localized geo-locational 
characteristics, the proposed system incorporated ASNs, localized spatial geo-location detection 
(LSGD) system, and DNS to achieve the identification of potential FFSNs. The authors believe 
that the detection capability of the LSGD system is better than spatial or temporal detection 
approaches. The LSGD system exhibits a lower FP rate than the spatial snapshot system in real-
time detection, which is completed within seconds. However, the highest FP rates are caused 
by CDNs, which have a similar localized spatial distribution signature that affects accuracy. 
Table 2. 6 shows the summary of spatial informational approaches. 
Table 2. 6 Summary of spatial informational real-time approaches. 
Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Caglayan 
et al. 
(2009) 
Bayesian 
belief 
network 
-Bayesian classifier 
employs multiple active 
and passive DNS 
sensors 
Reduces the 
observation 
period 
-Long time 
-Data center help 
is needed 
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-Generates a 
probabilistic assessment 
of the existence of a 
FFSNs 
Huang et 
al. (2010) 
Bayesian 
network 
classifier 
and 
K2 algorithm 
Determines the 
geographic traffic 
patterns of hosts and 
maps the IP address of a 
DNS response in a 
geographic coordinate 
system 
Lower FP rate 
than flux score-
based detection 
-Single IP 
problem  
-Missing value 
problem 
Horng-
Tzer et al. 
(2012) 
Bayesian 
network 
classifier and 
K2 algorithm 
Propose LSGD system 
for identifying FFSNs in 
real time  
Better detection 
capability than 
spatial or 
temporal 
detection 
approaches 
-Misled by CDN 
service sites 
 
B) Behaviour-based Approaches 
Many researchers have studied the behavior of the changes in fast flux domains. Caglayan, 
Toothaker, Drapaeau, Burke, and Eaton (2010) modeled the behavior pattern of FF botnets on 
the basis of DNS resource records using a Bayesian classifier. The authors determined that 
botnets exhibit common characteristics and form clusters according to botnet size, growth, and 
operations. Their findings show that a majority of fast flux botnets operate in at least five 
countries and between 20 and 40 countries on average. Unfortunately, their approach is misled 
by benign servers, such as CDNs, thus resulting in a high number of FPs (Caglayan et al., 2010).  
B. Yu, Smith, and Threefoot (2014) addressed the behaviour of fluxed domain changes and 
proposed a novel time series model on the basis of carefully selected features. Their model uses 
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network security and a semi-supervised training approach to overcome and identify difficulties 
in known supervised machine learning approaches. A horizontal scalable online system was 
proposed to deal with the large amount of data that passes through a network in real deployment. 
Their system can identify flux domains despite the presence of long TTLs or a limited number 
of mapped IP addresses. Actual latency is determined by an online system (10 min) given a 
domain name, whereas most active threats can be detected in less than 10 min. Their approach 
does not address the FN rates in the evaluation of the results. Table 2. 7 shows the behavior-
based approaches. 
Table 2. 7 Summary of behavior-based approaches. 
Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Caglayan 
et al. 
(2010) 
Bayesian 
classifier 
Modeling the behavioral 
patterns of fast flux botnets 
using DNS records 
-Botnets operate in 
20 to 40 countries 
- < 250 ASNs 
- Misled by 
CDNs 
-High number of 
FPs 
B. Yu et 
al. (2014) 
Time-series 
model 
-A time-series model 
–A horizontally scalable 
online system 
Captures fast flux 
domains 
 -Long detection 
time. 
-FN rate is not 
considered 
 
C) Machine Learning-based Approaches 
Qassrawi and Zhang (2012) used the algorithm of an alternative decision tree (Gothai & 
Balasubramanie, 2012) to determine whether a domain is an FF domain. Figure 2. 10 shows 
that only one DNS response resource record is needed to achieve fast detection in real time. 
Previous studies show that DNS information is insufficient to detect FF botnets (Martinez-Bea 
et al., 2013). 
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Figure 2. 10 Alternative decision tree detection approach(Qassrawi & Zhang, 2012) 
 
Unlike Qassrawi, Hsu et al. (C.-H. Hsu et al., 2010) proposed a real-time system to measure the 
delay for HTTP responses by relaying user requests from an FF-agent to back-end servers. Thus, 
a long delay means that a host (FF-agent) relayed a request to another server. The authors 
proposed this real-time system to reduce detection time to a few seconds without affecting 
detection accuracy (96% with FP and FN rates below 5%). The authors utilized a classification 
based on supervised learning using SVM trained on six features. The delays in the relaying 
request are counted because of the limited power and bandwidth of the relaying hosts (FF-
agents). However, extracting the six features from this volume is time consuming. Thus, 
keeping the detection time within the real-time range is difficult. The proposed system cannot 
effectively detect fast flux domains with long TTLs, and the detection accuracy is 67% (H.-T. 
Lin et al., 2013). The proposed detection system cannot detect zero-day domains. 
SVM was built by McGrath to detect fluxed phishing domains (D. Kevin McGrath, 
2009/09/01). The classifier was trained on the basis of the features extracted from the DNS 
responses, such as the number of IP addresses related to one domain, ASNs, number of different 
prefixes, and number of countries of an IP address. The main limitation of the classifier, based 
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on the nature of its features, is that it can be misled by botmasters. The previous classifier 
proposed in (C.-H. Hsu et al., 2010) can be misled by a benign server, such as a CDN or 
RRDNS. A new SVM classifier proposed by Martinez et al. (Martinez-Bea et al., 2013) was 
trained on real features from both domains and bots. Combining the two feature sets from the 
two previous approaches (D. Kevin McGrath, 2009/09/01; C.-H. Hsu et al., 2010) increased the 
TP and TN rates and decreased the FP and FN rates. Unfortunately, the author stated that the 
proposed method for detecting fast flux domains may still be evaded theoretically and that the 
proposed detection system cannot detect zero-day domains. 
The genetic based real-time approach for FFSN detection (GRADE) was proposed by H.-T. Lin 
et al. (2013). The authors assumed that fast flux bots are distributed arbitrarily in a multitude 
geographical locations. Thus, the distances between bots (FF-agent) and users differ. The fast 
flux domains would result in significant differences in the round trip time between the user and 
the agents. The GRADE system architecture is depicted in Figure 2. 11. GRADE can more 
effectively detect FFSNs (within a few seconds) than flux scores and is more accurate (98%) 
than fast flux bot detection and SSFD. However, GRADE suffers from the single IP problem, 
in which only one point in the geographic coordination system may cause GRADE to 
malfunction. Table 2. 8 summarizes real-time machine learning approaches. 
ASN QUERY MODULE
E-DPN MODULE
SD-RTT MODULE
WEIGHT OPTIMIZATION 
MODULE
FFSN DETECTION ENGINEDOMAIN NAME IP EXTRACTOR
Figure 2. 11 GRADE system architecture(H.-T. Lin et al., 2013) 
Table 2. 8 Summary of real-time learning approaches. 
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Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Qassrawi 
and Zhang 
(2012) 
Alternative 
decision tree 
One DNS response RR is 
needed to achieve FF 
detection in real time 
 
One DNS 
response RR in 
needed 
Insufficient 
features to 
conduct 
classification 
C.-H. Hsu 
et al. (2010) 
Linear SVM 
algorithm 
Observes longer delays 
for HTTP responses as a 
result of relaying the 
requests via fast flux 
agents 
 
-Real time  
-Robust 
-Lightweight 
-Long detection 
time 
-Cannot detect 
long TTL 
domains  
-Unable to detect 
zero-day 
domains 
Martinez-
Bea et al. 
(2013) 
Linear SVM 
algorithm 
Builds an SVM classifier 
trained via real features 
extracted from domains 
and bots to differentiate 
malicious FFNs 
-Increased TP 
and TN 
-Reduced FP 
and FN 
Unable to 
detect zero-day 
domains  
H.-T. Lin et 
al. (2013) 
Genetic 
algorithm 
The distances between 
clients and flux bots 
varies significantly 
Outperforms 
other systems, 
such as flux 
score, FFBD, 
and SSFD 
Single IP 
problem 
 
The proposed real-time approaches can detect malicious domain names and malicious FFSNs 
in most cases. However, the above-mentioned techniques have certain limitations, which cast 
doubt on their results (accuracy, TP, TN, FP, and FN), as some methods have high percentage 
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of false positive and others have low detection accuracy. We still lack a stable technique that 
can detect malicious domains, particularly zero-day domains, in an acceptable period of time 
with high detection accuracy.  
2.2.2 Router-based Detection Methods 
Many researchers have used different sets of information from network traffic to solve several 
network problems generally and particularly for the fast-flux botnet problem. Network traffic 
comprises both DNS traffic and non-DNS traffic. Recent studies (Al-Duwairi & Al-Hammouri, 
2014; Paul, Tyagi, Manoj, & Thanudas, 2014) did not rely on DNS data traffic.  Al-Duwairi 
and Al-Hammouri (2014) compared incoming and outgoing data traffic at a leaf router of stub 
networks to find matches between incoming and outgoing SYN packets. This online approach 
efficiently detects malicious fast flux agents within stub networks. However, installing the 
system on all the leaf routers of stub networks is difficult to achieve (scalability problem), and 
the utilized data traffic traces do not have fast flux traffic (Al-Duwairi & Al-Hammouri, 2014).  
A previous work (Paul et al., 2014) aimed to cluster similar packets in data traffic from both 
router sides assuming that the C&C servers had to change their IP addresses automatically. The 
approach assembles all packets, as shown in Figure 2. 12, between the C&C server and the host 
for analysis and obtains the malicious pattern in each cluster. The detection accuracy of this 
approach to malicious traffic is 95.8%, and its low FP rate is 1.6% in the worst case. However, 
the approach suffers from a scalability problem. Thus, when data traffic is insufficient, the 
malicious packet sensitivity decreases. Table 2. 9summarizes the router-based approaches. 
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Figure 2. 12 System architecture of the clustering detection method (Paul et al., 2014) 
 
Table 2. 9 Summary of router-based approaches. 
Author-s Algorithms 
Mechanism 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Al-
Duwairi 
and Al-
FF-watch 
algorithm 
Correlates incoming TCP 
connection requests to flux 
agents within a stub network 
with outgoing TCP connection 
Eliminates 
the need for 
large DNS 
traffic 
-Old dataset which 
may not contain FF 
traces 
-Scalability problem 
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Hammouri 
(2014) 
requests from the same agents to 
the point-of-sale website 
 
Paul et al. 
(2014) 
 PSD value 
used as 
classifier 
Computes the power spectral 
density (PSD) for each cluster 
and feeds it to the classifier, 
which examines the PSD data 
for significant peaks 
Detects 
traditional 
HTTP and 
fast flux 
botnets 
-Scalability problem  
-Malicious packet 
detection sensitivity 
problem 
 
Table 2.9 clearly indicates that constructing router-based systems to detect fast flux botnets may 
produce acceptable results for the authors. However, the speed and the large amount of data 
passing through the router cause three main problems to build systems: high false rates based 
on the concept of a fast detection of FF botnets, memory problems (databases) due to handling 
large traffic data flows, and a scalability problem. Therefore, detecting fast flux botnets and 
particularly zero-day domains at this part of the network is ineffective. 
2.2.3 DNS-based Detection Methods 
Researchers studied DNS data traffic in their country of origin. Thus, their work focused on 
monitoring and analyzing DNS data traffic and detecting malicious activities, such as fast flux 
botnets. Some researchers employed passive, active, and real-time approaches, as presented in 
the following subsections.  
2.2.3.1 Passive Approaches 
Researchers monitored DNS servers and analyzed data traffic passively to detect malicious 
activities. Gržnić, Perhoč, Marić, Vlašić, and Kulcsar (2014) presented a detection system called 
CROFlux that detects fast flux domains relying on a passive DNS replication method. Their 
system aims to reduce FP rates and detect unknown fast flux domains with flux characteristics, 
which are usually used to share malware. Thus, the approach avoids the reporting of legitimate 
domains with similar characteristics. The proposed system suffers from a design problem 
because it does not utilize active DNS requests to feed the system and many IP addresses can 
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enhance fast flux detection (Gržnić et al., 2014). The proposed system cannot detect zero-day 
fast flux domains because the classification process depends on the comparison of the number 
of malicious domains in the candidate fast flux cluster with predefined fixed malicious domains. 
A scalable and fast approach proposed by Kwon, Lee, Lee, and Perrig (2016) detects fast flux 
botnets on the basis of large-scale DNS traffic. This approach analyzes the collected large-scale 
DNS data traffic to extract malicious behaviors. A signal processing technique, namely, PSD 
analysis, is leveraged to determine the main frequencies from the periodic DNS queries initiated 
by botnets. Their system detection accuracy is 95%, given its detection of 23 unknown and 26 
known botnet groups with 0.1% FP. However, the proposed method relies on the number of 
hosts. Thus, increasing the number of hosts should decrease speed and detection efficiency. A 
threshold number should be assigned according to the circumstances of DNS servers; such 
threshold number differs for all DNS servers (Kwon et al., 2016). 
Some decision tree algorithm versions have been used for many detection techniques, such as 
the system proposed by Perdisci, Corona, Dagon, and Lee (2009). This system passively collects 
recursive DNS queries and responses by deploying multiple sensors in front of RDNS servers 
in two ISP networks. Perdisci analyzed the extracted features to detect malicious FFSNs using 
C4.5 decision tree. Their experiments showed that they accurately distinguished malicious and 
legitimate FFSNs. They used a statistically supervised learning approach to build a service 
classifier. Thus, this classifier cannot detect malicious zero-day flux services. 
Similarly, Perdisci, Corona, and Giacinto (2012) proposed a novel passive DNS system called 
FluxBuster using C4.5 decision tree as a classifier; this system analyzes DNS traffic for 
malicious FFN detection and blocking. Their approach gathers DNS traffic generated from 
hundreds of RDNSs, which are scattered in many networks around the world. A large-scale 
analysis is carried out on the basis of the resultant traffic. Thus, FluxBuster can detect unknown 
FFNs before they are reported in a public blacklist. However, the detection system waits for a 
user to click on a domain name to initiate a request and detect a domain. Furthermore, more IP 
addresses are needed to set the threshold value of their classifier. 
An anomaly-based technique using a decision tree with AdaBoost algorithm was proposed in a 
previous work (Vu Hong, 2012). This approach depends on the passive analyses of extracted 
48 
 
DNS data traffic to detect fast flux botnets. Two graphs were constructed, the lookup graph and 
the failure graph, from the extracted DNS traffic. The resulting graphs were distributed into 
clusters, as depicted in Figure 2. 13. These clusters exhibited a strong correlation between traffic 
elements (domain, host, and IP addresses). The related features of DNS traffic were extracted 
from these clusters to feed the classification module in the detection system and identify the 
existence of a fast flux botnet. The authors believed that they succeeded in detecting a fast flux 
botnet from traffic analysis. However, the system produces FP rates when the number of domain 
names in a malicious subgraph was small and produced FN rates when a benign subgraph 
included a large number of random-looking domain names. The malicious characteristics 
exhibited by the subgraph were not sufficiently distinctive for the technique to obtain. Table 2. 
10 summarizes passive DNS-based detection approaches. 
Graph construction
Graph 
decomposition
Feature extraction
Regression function
Domain DBWhoIS DB
Maliciousness score
Blacklist
Whitelist
Lookup and Frailer Graph
Dense Subgraph
Features
Inspected 
network
 
Figure 2. 13 Analysis procedure of an anomaly-based technique using a decision tree with 
AdaBoost algorithm (Vu Hong, 2012) 
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Table 2. 10 Summary of passive DNS-based detection approaches. 
Authors Algorithms 
Mechanism 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Gržnić et 
al. (2014) 
Publicly 
available and 
private 
malware lists 
Relies on the passive DNS 
replication method to detect 
suspicious fast flux domains 
Reduces FP -Design problem  
 -Unable to detect 
zero-day fast flux 
domains 
Kwon et 
al. (2016) 
PSD Leverages a signal processing 
technique to discover the 
major frequencies of periodic 
DNS queries of botnets 
Detection of 23 
unknown and 
26 known 
botnet groups 
-Increases in the 
number of hosts 
decreases the 
efficiency 
-Fixed threshold for 
all DNS servers 
Roberto 
Perdisci et 
al. (2009) 
C4.5 
decision tree 
Detects malicious flux service 
networks through passive 
analysis of recursive DNS 
traces 
Accurate 
classification 
Cannot detect zero-
day malicious flux 
services 
Roberto 
Perdisci et 
al. (2012) 
C4.5 
decision tree 
A passive DNS traffic analysis 
system for detecting and 
tracking malicious flux 
networks 
Detects 
unknown flux 
networks before 
blacklisting 
-wait user click 
-The threshold 
needs sufficient IP 
addresses to be set 
Vu Hong 
(2012) 
Decision tree 
with 
AdaBoost 
algorithm 
-Constructs a lookup graph and 
a failure graph from captured 
DNS traffic 
Helps detect 
botnets through 
traffic analysis 
-Produces FN and 
FP 
-Insufficient 
distinctive features 
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-Decomposes these graphs into 
clusters with a strong 
correlation between their 
domains, hosts, and IP 
addresses 
 
2.2.3.2 Active Approaches 
An active approach (Zhou, Leckie, & Karunasekera, 2009) adopts a collaborative detection 
system based on a decentralized correlation model called large-scale intrusion detection to 
detect fast flux phishing domains by analyzing the relationship between the number of IP 
addresses and DNS requests from different networks.  
Figure 2. 14 shows the combination of different DNS server responses to quantify the probable 
time to be saved. The results indicated that combining evidence from multiple DNS servers 
would speed up the process of fast flux detection. No significant time was saved, which leads 
to fast detection of fast flux domains. Table 2. 11 summarizes the active approaches. 
Table 2. 11 Summary of active approaches. 
Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Zhou et al. 
(2009) 
Decentralized 
correlation 
model called 
LarSID 
Correlation of 
multiple responses of 
DNS servers to 
increase detection 
time 
Reduces query 
time up to 30% 
Detection time 
is long 
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Figure 2. 14 LarSID architecture (Zhou et al., 2009) 
2.2.3.3 Real-time Approaches 
A real-time approach (Futai, Siyu, & Weixiong, 2013) was used to develop a fast flux botnet 
detection method. This approach employs the J48 decision tree algorithm as a classifier in a 
hybrid system, which combines real-time detection and long-term monitoring, as depicted in 
Figure 2. 15. Their approach can achieve a higher real-time detection rate compared with flux 
score-based methods. Still, the proposed approach cannot detect fast flux domains with high 
TTL values. Table 2. 12 summarizes the real-time approaches. 
52 
 
DNS Response
Suspicious domain 
filter
Long-term classifier
Real-time detector
Reached time limit
Probing & 
monitoring
Fast Flux
Benign
 
Figure 2. 15 Hybrid detection system(Futai et al., 2013) 
Table 2. 12 Summary of real-time approaches. 
 
The detection systems initiated over a DNS server do not exhibit network time delays. Many 
researchers determined that systems that depend on DNS features cannot provide an accurate 
detection rate for fast flux domains (Martinez-Bea et al., 2013). 
The main problem of fast flux botnet detection methods is detecting the evasion detection 
mechanism before the attack is initiated to support botnet malicious activities. This is 
Authors Algorithms Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages 
Futai et 
al. 
(2013) 
J48 decision 
tree 
Combines real-time 
detection and long-
term monitoring 
 Higher detection 
rate compared with 
flux score-based 
algorithms 
-Cannot detect FF domain 
with high TTL value 
-Cannot detect unknown 
FFSNs 
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particularly true when detecting zero-day domains without any prior knowledge about the 
incoming domain name, which serves malicious websites, C2 servers, and motherships. At the 
same time, detection accuracy and low detection error rates are monitored. On the basis of the 
developing strategies of attackers, the detection system should develop new systems that are 
long-lasting and adaptive to allow the future modification of their functions. Detection systems 
should continuously learn by analyzing new system inputs as new data instead of training with 
old data. 
2.2.4 Hydra Flux Service Network 
Hydra fast flux networks and SQL injection attacks are the main advanced features of Asprox 
botnets. Al-Bataineh and White (2012) studied the design and structure of Asprox botnets, in 
which communication protocols are used to download malicious codes, propagate malicious 
codes, and employ hydra FFSNs. The authors mentioned that SQL injection attacks are 
responsible for the recruitment of new bots and social engineering ruses to spread malware 
binaries. Hydra FFSNs prevent the disruption of the communication channel between bots and 
the C&C server. 
The crucial aspect of the hydra fast flux is the possibility of bots contacting other C&C servers 
when the original C&C server is taken down. Hydra is an advanced double fast flux that refluxes 
the name server and the host IP addresses, making the prevention of massive disruption 
impossible.  
2.2.6 Dynamic evolving Spiking Neural Network (DeSNN) 
 
Spiking Neural Network (SNN) is the third generation of neural network that adds the time 
element to the network. eSNN is an improvement on spiking neural network, as well as an 
extension of the ECOS models, employing integrate and fire neuron (IF) and Rank-Order 
learning (RO). A new improvement is a Dynamic evolving Spiking Neural Network (DeSNN) 
(Kasabov et al., 2013). The RO learning is built on the theory where the most significant 
information of an input pattern is enclosed in earlier incoming spikes, the priority of the inputs 
is comes from the incoming spikes order at the input synapses for a specific pattern. This is a 
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simulation of the biological system as well as an important base for some spatio-temporal hard 
cases.  
One of the main problems facing the fast flux Botnet detection methods is how to detect such 
an evasion detection mechanism before the attack begins, to support botnet malicious activities. 
This is especially so when detecting zero-day FFSNs without any prior knowledge about the 
incoming domain name serving the malicious website/C2 server/mothership, at the same time 
as keeping track of the detection accuracy and low detection error rates. In previous related 
work done by Almomani et al. to detect unknown zero-day phishing emails in online 
mode(Deeb Al-Mo et al., 2011), they classified phishing emails based on ECoS, which gives a 
promising platform for phishing detection. ECOS proved its adaptability in classification of 
ham and phishing emails in online mode based on a one pass algorithm for increased speed 
(Deeb Al-Mo et al., 2011), which accesses the data only once from the memory to create rules. 
A limitation of the ECoS algorithm used in that paper is that it classified phishing emails as 
traditional connectionist algorithms which need a careful assignment of their parameters. 
According to Demertzis and Iliadis (2015), eSNN is used to detect DGA domain names. The 
authors proposed a fast evolving Smart URL Filter in Zone-based Policy Firewall. Their work 
promised improvement on zone-based policy, but the inclusion of self-modified parameter 
values are still necessary to get more efficiency. 
Dynamic evolving spiking neural network is used as an output classifier under the NeuCube 
platform (Alvi, Pears, & Kasabov, 2017), as the DeSNN is achieved outstanding success in 
spatio-temporal classification problem in many areas. Also, the DeSNN algorithm was used in 
(Doborjeh & Kasabov, 2016) to perform the output classifier with NeuCube platform in 
supervised learning mode. 
(Kasabov et al., 2013) introduced the dynamic evolving spiking neural network that utilized  the 
rank-order learning and SDSP spike-time learning in unsupervised, supervised, or semi-
supervised modes. The results were performed a high level of accuracy and speed comparing 
with other SNN algorithms. However, the algorithm suffer from many parameters to be set 
before implement the algorithm.  
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According to (Doborjeh, Capecci, & Kasabov, 2014), a DeSNN algorithm used as classifier in 
NeuCube platform, where the NeuCube model was used for FMRI data learning. Nevertheless, 
the model is extremely influenced by its parameters values. Alauthman and Almomani (2017) 
used the DeSNN as a classifier over the NeuCube platform to detect the spam email.   
As a result, all the three solution scopes were discussed, the advantages and disadvantages, 
current work tends to be implemented as a root at the end host-based part of the network, Also, 
this system can be implemented at the local DNS server in order to work as defender in case of 
threats and risks. Fast flux domains act in an online mode to keep up their duties as a response 
to the mothership orders, so the need for online detection system became necessary to try to 
shut down such threats. The proposed system is expected to detect FFDN in online mode with 
high detection accuracy and low false positive and negative rates respectively. It is also expected 
to have a high level of performance depending on using one-pass algorithm and chosen proper 
feature set, also the proposed system should work for a lifetime with low memory usage.  
2.3 Related Work  
Holz et al. (2008) were the first who proposed a system that measures and detects a FFSN on 
the basis of the calculated flux score. Their proposed system takes malicious domains from 
spam emails and then uses the Dig tool to generate DNS lookups and reverse DNS lookups and 
thereby obtain necessary information about a feature set, for the sake of space all the features 
of all the related works displayed in Table 2.13. Thus, the flux score calculation is fed for use 
later in distinguishing between malicious FFSNs and legitimate ones. Their results showed that 
the proposed system achieves a detection accuracy of 99.98%.  
Some decision tree algorithm versions have been used for many detection techniques, such as 
the system proposed by Roberto Perdisci et al. (2009), which passively collects recursive DNS 
queries and responses by deploying multiple sensors in front of RDNS servers in two ISP 
networks. They analyzed the extracted features to detect malicious FFSNs using a C4.5 decision 
tree. Their experiments showed that they accurately distinguished malicious and legitimate 
FFSNs.  
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In the naïve Bayes classifier used by Passerini et al. (2008), all malicious domains are collected 
from spam emails. Their detection and monitoring “FluXOR” system relies on the idea of a host 
being a victim to such scams. The system begins to send requests and gathers the feature set 
information to feed the naïve Bayes classifier. FluXOR reduces the time of detection to 1–3 h, 
which is still relatively long. 
Zhao and Traore (2012) proposed another method (REPTree) for botnet detection using a 
decision tree with reduced error pruning. This type of machine learning decision tree is used to 
classify and identify malicious FFSNs by defining and computing some of the network metrics 
captured from network flows.  
The support vector machine (SVM) was used by X. Yu et al. (2012) to detect fast flux botnets 
by analyzing the patterns of DNS queries from FF botnets. They extracted six features to build 
the weighted SVM classifier for use in distinguishing legitimate and FF botnet domains. They 
noted that using SVM to identify fast flux botnets is effective and provides a satisfactory 
detection accuracy.  
Celik and Oktug (2013) used the C4.5 decision tree algorithm to evaluate various DNS feature 
sets and put forward a detection approach, which is a high-dimensional feature vector with 
various features, including timing network, spatial, and NS and DNS response information. 
C4.5 evaluates each feature set of previous vectors and decides which one is the best feature 
vector on the basis of detection accuracy. Combining all features together provides a detection 
accuracy of 98.9%. 
The above researches used different features as stated in Table 2.13,  Holz et al. (2008); 
(Passerini et al., 2008; Perdisci et al., 2009; X. Yu et al., 2012; Zhao & Traore, 2012) provided 
different methods to detect the fast flux domains and FFSN. All except Holz used supervised 
learning approaches to build their classifiers. Thus, the classifiers cannot detect malicious zero-
day flux domains. The coefficients used in the score calculation (Holz et al., 2008) require 
modification to ensure the highest possible accuracy of the detection system. 
 
 
57 
 
Table 2. 13 List of the features used in previous works  
Related work 
papers 
Features 
Holz et al. 
(2008) 
Number of A records, number of autonomous system numbers (ASNs), and 
number of NS. 
Perdisci et al. 
(2009) 
Number of resolved IPs, Number of domains, Avg TTL per domain, 
Network prefix diversity, Number of domains per network, IP Growth Ratio, 
Autonomous System (AS) diversity, BGP prefix diversity, Organization 
diversity, Country Code diversity, Dynamic IP ratio, and Average Uptime 
Index. 
Passerini et al. 
(2008) 
Domain age, Domain registrar, Number of distinct DNS records of type “A, 
Time-to-live of DNS resource records, Number of distinct networks, Number 
of distinct, ASN, , Number of distinct resolved qualified domain names , 
Number of distinct assigned network names, and Number of distinct 
organizations. 
Chen et al. 
(2014) 
Number of A records in answer section, number of distinct ASNs for all A 
records, number of A records for NSs, number of distinct ASNs for all NSs, 
TTL of A records in answer section,  and TTL of A records for domain’s 
NSs. 
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
Number of unique ASNs, The number of Cname, number of name server 
(NS), number of different IP addresses, TTL, and Rate flux. 
Yu et al. (2012) Domain age, number of IP addresses of a distinct DNS A records, TTL, IP 
distribution, ASN, and organizational distribution. 
Celik and 
Oktug (2013) 
Various features including: timing network, spatial, NS and DNS response 
information. 
Zhao and 
Traore (2012) 
TTL, Number of unique A records, IP in the same Networks, IP Geolocation, 
IP Geolocation, and Domain lifetime,  
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Zhao and Jin 
(2015) 
Intrinsic Characteristics of Fast-flux Net, Intrinsic Features of DNS Analysis, 
and Intrinsic Features of Process of Visiting FFSN Domains 
Vu Hong 
(2012) 
Median domain's life time, Median IP's life time, Domain/IP ratio, Median 
number of distinct domains, Median number of distinct IPs, Median number 
of IPs per query, Median maximum TTL value, Network diversity of return 
IPs, Dominant domain ratio, Dominant host ratio, Lexical features on domain 
labels, Query pattern, IP overlap, and IP growth rate. 
 
Chen et al. (2014) proposed Bayesian probability theory to distinguish between benign and 
malicious domains using dissimilar ASNs, reverse DNS lookups, and domain registration time 
features. They aimed to detect a fast flux website on the basis of its fluxed characteristics. The 
result of this proposed system presents its ability to identify possible threats.  
Chen et al. (2011) used the k-nearest neighbor (KNN) and random forest (RF) as sampling 
techniques to solve the imbalanced problem, with respect to FFSN detection. In addition, they 
proposed a sampling technique that is combined with feature extraction from datasets for use in 
fast flux detection. The result showed that the TTL is an important feature to the classification 
of the proposed technique.  
The classification and regression tree algorithm is used in the method proposed by Zhao and Jin 
(2015). This method uses a small dataset to quickly distinguish legitimate and malicious FFSNs. 
This method is mainly based on FFSN domains, DNS, and the process of HTTP visiting.  
Yoshioka and Matsumoto used distinct mapping of features (Pa et al., 2015). The classification 
process needs less than a few days, and the detection accuracy is 90%.  
An anomaly-based technique using a decision tree with AdaBoost algorithm was proposed by 
Vu Hong (2012). This approach depends on the passive analyses of extracted DNS data traffic 
to detect fast flux botnets. Two graphs were constructed, namely, the lookup and failure graphs, 
from the extracted DNS traffic. The resulting graphs were distributed into clusters. These 
clusters exhibited a strong correlation between traffic elements (domain, host, and IP addresses). 
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The related features of DNS traffic were extracted from these clusters to feed the classification 
module in the detection system and identify the existence of a fast flux botnet.  
Some of the related work showed low detection accuracy based on the feature set chosen, such 
as in (Celik & Oktug, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011; Vu Hong, 2012), and others 
need long time to gather sufficient information for these features, such as in (Passerini et al., 
2008; Zhao & Jin, 2015).  
The two closest works to the current study are the works developed by Celik and Oktug (2013) 
and Lin et al. (2013). 
According to H.-T. Lin et al. (2013) a genetic approach was proposed as a real-time detection 
solution of the fast flux domains problem. This method suggested a two-detection feature to 
classify the benign and the flux domains. Firstly, the entropy of the domain name (E-DPN) of 
the preceding node of the flux node (flux-agent). By using the trace route of all the returned IPs 
from the DNS response. Of course, if the E-DPN is high then, most probably, the domain is 
classified as benign, otherwise it is classified as fluxed. Secondly, the Standard Deviation of 
Round Trip Time (SD-RTT) between the user and all the return IPs of the flux-agents, assuming 
that the scatter flux-agent is going to produce a high value of the SD-RTT. This spatial feature 
takes the number of different ASNs and number of IPs return in single DNS response in their 
calculations. Unfortunately, this two detection features was evaded by the botmaster, as it 
controls the returned list of IPS that the user receives. The returned list could have IPs in the 
same ASN or adjacent to the user ASN, so the above measures can inaccurately classify the 
benign and flux domains. On the other hand, botmaster may return a list that contains just a 
single IP address, which leads to ineffective detection of the domains (F.-H. Hsu et al., 2014; 
Otgonbold, 2014). Although genetic algorithms provide good accuracy (as stated in their paper), 
their results could be affected by returning a list of IP addresses belonging to the same AS. 
According to current implementations the overall accuracy of the linear classifier was (95.37 
%). Also, the linear decision function used as the classifier needs to estimate the categorizer of 
the linear function, so if the estimation is good then the linear function will work properly, 
otherwise the classification process will contain significant errors. (Chahal & Khurana, 2016). 
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On the other hand, the second compared algorithm was the C4.5 as presented in (Celik & Oktug, 
2013). Several feature sets were examined to detect fast flux network. Such feature sets consist 
of timing based, spatial based, network based, domain based, and DNS answer-based feature 
sets. As mentioned in the literature the data set was small and the accuracy of the experiment 
was high. Also, when all features are involved in the experiment the prediction results become 
insensitive to two features (timing and domain based feature sets) (Otgonbold, 2014). Besides, 
as C4.5 algorithm is considered as a supervised learning algorithm, it could not be used to 
discover the unknown attacks, especially the zero-day fast flux domains. Moreover, according 
to our implementation the accuracy was not as high as stated in their paper; rather it was 93.38%. 
When this result and the previous linear results were compared to the current proposed 
ADeSNN, obviously the proposed approach overcame the two methods. Discussions in section 
in chapters four and five showed other accuracy measures indicating the results. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a wide-range of the literature on fast flux detection approaches was studied to 
choose the most suitable techniques and methods that were used for detecting fast flux domains. 
The techniques and methods were explored based on various aspects, such as the feature sets 
used to classify FFD and classification accuracy. The approach of this study includes scope of 
solution, testing criteria for classification, and mode of detection, whether online or offline. 
Also included is a theoretical background for evaluating the selected approaches.  
Besides, the literature showed some approaches that have used the dynamic evolving neural 
network in different areas, most of them were implemented as a classifiers under the NeuCube 
platform, its been clear that the DeSNN algorithm has many parameters that has to be set before 
run the algorithm. Based on this the current research is going to address this issue as one of its 
problem space. 
On the other hand, the DeSNN algorithm still need to be improved to best enhanced the 
classification accuracy, so the current research will focus on improving the performance of the 
algorithm as well. Also, the literature review proved that the gap of knowledge according to the 
zero-day domains problem. Where most of the work done so far do not solve this problem. 
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In the next chapter, the adaptive dynamic evolving spiking neural network based on the 
proposed initial weight of spike time, as one of the contributions of this study, will be introduced 
and explained in detail.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADAPTIVE DYNAMIC EVOLVING SPIKING NEURAL NETWORK – 
ADESNN 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the first contribution of the current work, which is the initial weight 
initialization based on the spike time of the incoming inputs. Then, the adaptive dynamic 
evolving spiking neural network algorithm and the original one are compared. Finally, the 
achieved results are discussed.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the proposed adaptive DeSNN. DeSNN algorithm that is built based on 
the RO learning rules and the SDSP learning algorithm. According to previous work, the initial 
weight of the DeSNN is calculated based on the RO rules. As stated in (Kasabov et al., 2013), 
the output of the DeSNN algorithm consists of the initial and final weight matrices, as a new 
incoming input pattern is arrived an initial weight is computed as well as the final weight. At 
the recall mode the classification of the new arrival is going to be based on the Euclidean 
distance testing measure-. Experiments showed that the current initial weight based on the RO 
setting introduces a clear misclassification percentage of detecting of the incoming inputs, while 
the proposed approaches give a satisfactory accuracy percentage compared with the former one. 
3.2 Adaptive Dynamic Evolving Spiking Neural Network  
The expected approach is an online detection approach, and is dealing with real data so spiking 
neural network (SNN) is used. Systems based on SNN have already showed their ability to 
capture spatial and temporal data. Evolving Spiking Neural Network (eSNN), are based on a 
one-pass rank order (RO) learning rules and a scheme to evolve a new spiking neuron and 
connections, which lead to learn new patterns from arriving data. This chapter presents an 
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adaptation of the dynamic evolving spiking neural network (deSNN), that employ both RO 
learning and dynamic synapses to learn spatial and temporal data in a fast and on-line mode. By 
employing both RO learning and Spike Driven Synaptic Plasticity SDSP, deSNN -as depicted 
in Figure 3. 1 - could be used in unsupervised, supervised, or semi-supervised learning modes. 
The proposed approach is a hybrid learning approach, where the supervised learning phase 
works offline and the unsupervised learning phase works online to detect the zero-day domains. 
The SDSP learning is used to dynamically update the connection weights of the network that 
capture data clusters both through training and through recall. 
 
INPUT(FEATURES)
CLASS  1
CLASS  K
ROC
L1 NEURONS
L2 NEURONS
 
Figure 3. 1 An evolving spiking neural network (classification) (Kasabov et al., 2013) 
 
At training phase for each training input pattern 𝜒 𝜄 , a new output neuron j is created, also the 
connection weights wij of the input neurons (feature) is initiated according to Matrix (1), the 
weights calculations are based on the spike times of each input: 
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Matrix 𝜒0 contains the input records of all inputs.  
 
𝜒 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝜒11   𝜒11 …    𝜒1𝑚
𝜒21   𝜒21 …    𝜒2𝑚
.
.
.
𝜒𝑛1   𝜒𝑛1 …    𝜒𝑛𝑚}
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    (𝜒 0)                                                                    
 
Here the first row of the matrix 𝜒 refers to the input record, where the first record consists of 
the feature set, and so on. "n" refers to the number of the inputs records, “m" is the number of 
features in each input record. Matrix (1) below contains the spike times of all input records after 
ROC encoding process exploiting Gaussian receptive field (Soltic & Kasabov, 2010). Here, the 
first contribution of the proposed approach is to use the spike time records as the initial weight 
instead of the initial weight created using RO learning rules as stated in (Kasabov et al., 2013). 
More about this contribution is discussed in details in this chapter. 
 
𝑺𝑻 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑆𝑇11   𝑆𝑇11 …    𝑆𝑇1𝑚
𝑆𝑇21   𝑆𝑇21 …    𝑆𝑇2𝑚
.
.
.
𝑆𝑇𝑛1   𝑆𝑇𝑛1 …    𝑆𝑇𝑛𝑚}
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 (1) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑇ij refers to the spike time of the 𝜄th input record. Each record comes as a result of the 
number of the Gaussian receptive fields multiplied by the number of the features of the original 
input record. Moreover, the proposed contribution is to replace the initial value that was set by 
the RO learning rules by the spike times of the input records after the ROC encoding. The reason 
behind this modification is to improve the detection accuracy. Figure 3.2 shows both the initial 
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weights initiation techniques for both the RO and the spiketime initial weights, it is clear that 
using the spike time instead of the rank of the spikes order is more related to the incoming data, 
and helps in classifying input records correctly as depicted in Figure 3.2: 
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Figure 3. 2 An example of the RO and Spike Times initial values 
According to the work done in (Kasabov et al., 2013), DeSNN algorithm is belt based on rank 
order learning rules to set the initial weight of the synapses among the input and the output 
neurons. Furthermore, SDSP adjusts the weight of the synapses based on the upcoming spikes, 
so at the end the DeSNN algorithm, the output is the weight matrices of the initial weight based 
on the RO rules, and the final weight is based on the SDSP learning rules.  
One significant insight into the initial weight setting by the RO learning rules is that it has been 
noticed that all malicious and non-malicious input values are given the same initial values as 
depicted in Figure 3.2. This is because of the fixed mechanism of the RO initial values, the 
similarities between the outputs values of the final weight of the SDSP weight matrix of 
different inputs will be almost high, even with the updates on the synapses weights caused by 
the working of the evolving spiking neural network. These similarities are going to affect the 
classification process of both the malicious and non-malicious inputs, as the classification here 
66 
 
is based on the minimum Euclidian distances between the testing sample and the weight of the 
training samples at recall phase.  
When the initial weight initialized based on the spike time matrix, so this helps in the 
classification process butter than assigned the same fixed weights mechanism for all different 
inputs. Figure 3.2 shows the idea more clearly. To show the effect of this change, this 
phenomenon will be discussed in the results and discussion sections of this chapter. 
After the initiation of the weight on the synapses of jth neuron based on the spike time matrices 
of the incoming inputs, the dynamic synapses adjust their weights based on the SDSP algorithm 
according to equation (2). While the spike arrives at any time t, weight value increases, as there 
is no spikes arriving at this time, weight value decreases: 
∆𝜔𝑗, 𝑖
(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑇𝑗(𝑡). 𝐷                                                                                           (2) 
Where 𝑆𝑇j(t) equals to 1, if there is a sequenced spike at time t arrives at synapse j of arriving 
learning patterns at the output neuron j, and it equals to (-1) otherwise. D is the drift parameter, 
which can be changed for up or down drifts. 
In parallel, all synapses change their values in every time unit t according to equation (3), while 
the input patterns Pi arrive at the output neuron i. Based on these values which may go up or 
down, the synapses of the neuron all together could capture nearly all relationships of spike 
timing through the learned pattern. Continuously, as the incoming training patterns arrive (input 
spikes on different synapses), they are encoded within the time window T. Then the threshold 
Thi of the neuron is defined. Based on the value of this threshold the neuron i spikes or not. The 
threshold is defined in equation (4) as a fraction of the entire PSPi (PSPimax) collected through 
the appearance of the Entire input pattern 
 
𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 = ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑗(𝑡). 𝜔𝑗, 𝑖(𝑡)𝑗=1,2,…,𝑀𝑡=1,2,…,𝑇                                                     (3) 
𝑇ℎ𝑖 = 𝐶. 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                                                                 (4) 
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Where: T is the time window in which the input patterns arrived, M is the number of neuron I 
input synapses, 𝑓𝑗(𝑡) equals to 1 if the spike appears in the time window at the synapse j for 
this input pattern, if not it equals to 0. 𝜔𝑗, 𝑖(𝑡) is the efficacy of the dynamic synapse between 
the neurons j,i which is calculated in equation (2). 
Figure 3.3 shows the architecture of the DeSNN algorithm, also positions the rank order 
encoding method based on multiple Gaussian receptive fields. In addition, the figure presents 
the SDSP learning rule which adjusts the synapses weights.  These weights change up and down 
based on the drift parameter value which is discussed before. 
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Figure 3. 3 The DeSNN algorithm architecture 
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The original DeSNN algorithm is mentioned in the algorithm 3.1 in this chapter.   
Algorithm 3.1 The original deSNN algorithm(Kasabov et al., 2013): 
 
 Setting deSNN parameters* (RO and the SDSP parameters too) 
 For each input spatio-temporal spiking pattern Pi Do 
o Create a new output neuron i for this pattern and calculate the initial values of 
connection weights wi(0) using the RO learning formula (1). 
o Adjust the connection weights wi for consecutive spikes on the corresponding 
synapses using the SDSP learning rule formula (2). 
o Calculate PSPimax using formula (3). 
o Calculate the spiking threshold of the ith neuron using formula (4). 
o (Optional) If [ The new neuron weight vector wi is to the weight vector of an 
already trained output neuron] then  
 merge the two neurons 
o Else 
 Add it to the output neurons repository. 
o End If 
 End For  
 
3.3 Dataset  
Two public datasets were used in this chapter to evaluate the performance of both the DeSNN 
and the Adaptive DeSNN algorithms (Especially to evaluate the effect of using the new 
proposed initial weight ). As the proposed adaptive algorithm classify fast flux and benign 
domains and the unsupervised phase of the proposed FFKA approach capture the new fast flux 
pattern. So, IRIS dataset (Benjamin & R.A., 2013) and Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast Cancer 
(WDBC) dataset (Dua, 2017) is introduced. The public IRIS dataset, consists of 3 classes each 
with 50 instances, this dataset is the best known dataset for pattern recognition (Barra, 
Casanova, Narducci, & Ricciardi, 2015; Z. Lin, Ma, Meng, & Chen, 2018). One class is linearly 
separable from the other two, but the latter two classes are not separable from each other. The 
IRIS dataset has 4 features which are (sepal length, sepal width, petal length, and petal width). 
WDBC public dataset is a well-known binary medical dataset and many of machine learning 
algorithms used it in their experiments for pattern recognition and classification purposes 
(Aličković & Subasi, 2017; Basu, Roy, & Savitha, 2018; Mandal, 2017; Zheng, Yoon, & Lam, 
2014), the characteristics of both datasets are depicted in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3. 1 Characteristics of the WDBC dataset. 
Dataset Number of 
Classes Records features 
IRIS dataset 3 150 4 
Wisconsin Diagnostic breast cancer 
(WDBC) 
2 569 10 
The ten real-valued features of WDBC are computed for each cell nucleus: (radius (mean of 
distances from center to points on the perimeter), texture (standard deviation of gray-scale 
values), perimeter, area, smoothness (local variation in radius lengths), compactness 
(perimeter^2 / area - 1.0), concavity (severity of concave portions of the contour), concave 
points (number of concave portions of the contour), symmetry, and fractal dimension). 
3.4 Experiments, Result, and Comparison 
This subsection shows the results of the experiments that were conducted on the DeSNN and 
ADeSNN algorithms. Then, both results were compared to each other to prove that the 
performance of the adaptations that have been introduced on DeSNN have significantly 
improved the results.  
The idea behind modifying the DeSNN algorithm came from many of our experiments; it 
seemed that the result always gave the same range of certain results boundaries. While tracing 
the variables’ values and each process outputs, it became clear that the problem was the setting 
of the initial weight that is the RO initial weight. The initial weight sets by the RO is based on 
giving the same values with different orders, and this order was changed based on the spike 
time of the incoming spike at the identified neuron, as depicted in Figure 3.2.  
Next, two experiments were conducted to prove the efficiency of the proposed adaptive 
ADeSNN compared with the original DeSNN as mentioned in algorithm 3.1. Two public 
datasets were also used. These datasets have non-leaner separable attributes, and therefore the 
classification task was not straight forward. 
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The software and hardware used in these experiments were based on Linux mint operating 
system run with the following attributes, core i7 7500U CPU, 16GB RAM,  the simulations of 
the compared method were conducted using MATLAB 8.5 and Python 2.7 environments. 
Various detection accuracy methods were conducted to evaluate the proposed algorithm, and 
the results of these measures are presented in each experiment. Table 3.2 provides the 
description of the measures used in this experiment. 
Table 3. 2 Accuracy measure used in all experiments 
Measure Equation Description 
True positive 
TP 
∑ (1),𝑖𝟏  where 𝑖 belongs to positive 
instances 
Number of benign domains accurately 
identified as benign domains 
True negative 
TN 
∑ (1),𝑖𝟏  where 𝑖 belongs to negative 
instances 
Number of fast flux domains accurately 
identified as fast flux domains 
False positive 
FP 
∑ (1),𝑖𝟏  where 𝑖 does not belong to 
positive instances 
Number of fast flux domains identified as 
benign domains. 
False negative 
FN 
∑ (1),𝑖𝟏  where 𝑖 does not belong to 
negative instances 
Number of benign domains identified as fast 
flux domains. 
False positive 
rate  
𝑭𝑷𝑹 
 
𝑭𝑷
(𝑻𝑵 + 𝑭𝑷)
 
 
 
The percentage of positive cases 
misclassified as negative cases 
 
Recall or True 
positive rate 
𝑻𝑷𝑹 
𝑻𝑷
(𝑻𝑷 + 𝑭𝑵)
 
 
 
The percentage of positive cases that 
classified as positive cases. 
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Accuracy 
𝑨𝑪𝑪 
(𝑻𝑷 + 𝑻𝑵)
(𝑻𝑷 + 𝑻𝑵 + 𝑭𝑷 + 𝑭𝑵)
 
 
 
The percentage of correct predictions of all 
instances. 
Precision 
 
 
𝑻𝑷
(𝑻𝑷 + 𝑭𝑷)
 
 
The percentage of cases correctly classified 
as positive cases. 
Fmeasure 
(𝟐 ×   𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 ×   𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍)
(𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍)
 
 
 
Accuracy test measure using both the 
precision and the recall. 
 
Root mean 
square error 
RMSE 
 
√∑
(𝒚𝒊 − 𝒕𝒊)𝟐
𝑵
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
 
 
 
The differences between the target and the 
actual expected value 
 
Where:  𝑁 ∶ 𝑁umber of input, 𝑦𝑖: Actual value, 𝑡𝑖: Target value. 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 is an vital measure of differences between the values expected from a model 
and the values actually detected. 
Non-
Dimensional E
rror Index 
 
𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑰 =
𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑬 
𝒔𝒕𝒅(𝒕𝒊)
 
 
 
NDEI is used to estimate the prediction 
quality (Espinosa & Vandewalle, 2000). 
The Matthews 
Correlation 
Coefficient  
(𝑻𝑷 × 𝑻𝑵) − (𝑭𝑷 × 𝑭𝑵)
√((𝑻𝑷 + 𝑭𝑷)(𝑻𝑷 + 𝑭𝑵)(𝑻𝑵 + 𝑭𝑷)(𝑻𝑵 + 𝑭𝑵)
 
 
 
  MCC is used to evaluate the efficiency of 
the classifier in imbalanced classes 
(Matthews, 1975). 
The receiver 
operating 
characteristic 
ROC 
Graphical plot that depicts a binary 
classifier’s performance 
ROC arcs plot the true positive rate on the 
vertical axis and the false positive rate on the 
horizontal axis 
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The AUC represents the classifier’s performance (Swets, 2014). Likewise, the AUC is well-
known to be a more robust estimator of classifier performance (Fawcett, 2006). 
A question may raise why the two datasets were used in this research. This was done to prove 
that the initial weight initialization based on the spike times would give better results in the 
classification process than the old method. To the best of our knowledge, no one has pointed to 
this problem before. To ensure the quality of the proposed adaptation of the AdeSNN algorithm, 
a cross-validation method is used to estimate the error rate.  
 The first experiment was conducted to show the performance of the two algorithms, the 
proposed adaptive ADeSNN and the original DeSNN as mentioned in algorithm 3.1. Therefore, 
the IRIS public dataset was exploited. It consists of 3 classes each with 50 instances; this dataset 
is the best-known dataset for pattern recognition as this study is dealing with looking to detect 
new unknown patterns (zero-day domains). One class is linearly separable from the other two, 
but the latter two classes are not separable from each other. The dataset was randomly initiated 
into three groups, then the experiments of 3-fold cross-validation datasets were selected. At the 
end of these three experiments the average was taken to present the results shown in Table 3.3 
and Figure 3.4. 
Table 3. 3 The 3-fold cross-validation result of both the original DeSNN and the proposed 
ADeSNN of the first experiment 
Evaluation measures DeSNN ADeSNN 
FNR 0.4400 0.0625 
TPR 0.5600 0.9375 
ACC 0.5600 0.9167 
Precision 0.5600 0.9091 
Recall 0.5600 0.9375 
F1-Measure 0.5600 0.9231 
MCC 0.1200 0.8327 
AUC 0.5600 0.9152 
RMSE 0.6633 0.2887 
NDEI 1.3200 0.5749 
MSE 0.4400 0.0833 
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Figure 3. 4 The accuracy measures of both DeSNN and ADeSNN 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the average of the cross-validations of both algorithms. The error 
measures (RSME, NDEI, and MSE-ERROR) of the proposed adaptive ADeSNN were less than 
those for the original DeSNN as mentioned in algorithm 3.1, which means that the adaptation 
of the DeSNN will minimize the misclassification of the input instances. For example, the root 
mean square error of the original algorithm was 66% while in the adaptive algorithm became 
28%, also the non-dimensional error index value for the original algorithm according to this 
experiments was 1.32 compared with the adaptive algorithm which was 0.57. This also helps to 
maximize the accuracy of the detection and classification. In addition, the MCC is a 
performance metric which is widely used in bioinformatics. The two algorithms used this metric 
because it best deals with the imbalanced data, and this leads us to conclude that the adaptive 
algorithm has a high degree of correctness, surpassing the original one even in cases of 
imbalanced data. By comparing the following accuracy measures, all of F-measure, Recall, and 
ACC they revealed that the proposed adaptation produced more accurate results than the 
original DeSNN. The precision measure value enhanced to reach 90% while it was 56% in the 
original algorithm, as well as the recall measure reached the 93%, and the f-measure became 
92% .The overall accuracy of DeSNN was (56%) while it was (91.67%) for ADeSNN. 
According to the IRIS dataset two classes were non-linearly separable which cause to show 
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almost 91% accuracy while it was tested on the first linearly separable classes and give 100% 
accuracy. This leads to the ability of the adaptive DeSNN to classify classes even when inputs 
are mutually mixed. Finally, ADeSNN exhibited higher true positive rate and less false negative 
rate than DeSNN as depicted in Figure 3.4.    
The parameters of the ADeSNN algorithm set in the experiment are shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3. 4 The parameter values used in the 3-cross-validations of the first experiment 
Neurons and synapses equations 
parameters 
Value Unit 
Excitatory synapse time constant (tau_exc) 2  Ms 
Inhibitory synapse time constant (tau_inh) 5  Ms 
Neuron time constant (tau_mem) 20 Ms 
Membrane leak (El) 20 mV 
Spike threshold (Vthr) 800 mV 
Reset value (Vrst) 0  mV 
Fixed inhibitory weight (winh) 0.20 V 
Fixed excitatory weight (wexc) 0.40 V 
Thermal voltage (UT) 25  mV 
Refractory period (refr) 4  Ms 
SDSP parameters   
Up/Down weight jumps (Vthm) 0.75*Vthr mV 
Calcium variable time constant (tau_ca) 5 *tau mem Ms 
Steady-state asymptote for Calcium 
variable (wca) 
50  mV 
Stop-learning threshold 1 (stop if Vca < 
thk1) 
1.7 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTD if Vca 
> thk2) 
2.2 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTP if Vca 
> thk3) 
8 × (wca–wca) mV 
Plastic synapse (NMDA) time constant 9  Ms 
Plastic synapse high value (wp hi) 6  mV 
Plastic synapse low value (wp lo) 0  mV 
Bistability drift 0.25  
Delta weight 0.12 × wp_hi mV 
Input size 150 spike train  
Simulation time 40  Ms 
Default clock unit 0.2 Ms 
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The second experiment was conducted and exploited the public WDBC dataset in order to prove 
the effectiveness of the proposed adaptation on the original DeSNN algorithm. WDBC public 
dataset is a well-known binary medical dataset and many machine learning algorithms used it 
in their experiments for pattern recognition and classification purposes. The WDBC dataset has 
ten real-valued features for each cell nucleus, where they computed from a digitized image of a 
fine needle aspirate of a breast mass, which are radius, texture, perimeter, area, smoothness, 
compactness, concavity, concave points, symmetry, and fractal dimension. Furthermore, the 
dataset contains 569 instances presenting two classes the (diagnosis: B = benign, M = 
malignant), the two classes distribution were 357 benign, 212 malignant. Finally, this dataset 
has no missing attribute values. 
Current experiment distributed the dataset into 5-fold cross-validations groups. So, five 
separated experiments were done, where the instances randomly distributed on the five groups, 
then the results were computed and the average was taken, as depicted in Table 3.5 and Figure 
3.5, the result of several measures to compare both of the original and the proposed adaptive 
algorithms were presented.    
Table 3. 5 The 5-fold cross-validation result of both the original DeSNN and the proposed 
ADeSNN of the second experiment 
 
Evaluation measures DeSNN ADeSNN 
FNR 0.402439 0.04898 
TPR 0.597561 0.95102 
ACC 0.765957 0.971631 
Recall 0.597561 0.95102 
F_measure 0.748092 0.958824 
MCC 0.619046 0.937925 
RMSE 0.483779 0.172406 
NDEI 0.965842 0.344209 
mse_error 0.234043 0.029787 
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  Figure 3. 5 The accuracy measures of both DeSNN and ADeSNN 
 
Table 3.5 showed the result of average of the cross-validations of both algorithms. The error 
measure (RSME, NDEI, and MSE-ERROR) values of the proposed adaptive ADeSNN were 
less than those for the original DeSNN, which means the adaptation on the DeSNN will 
minimize the misclassification of the input instances, and maximize the accuracy of the 
detection and classification. In addition, the MCC is a performance metric which is widely used 
in bioinformatics, the two algorithms  used this metric  because they best deal with the 
imbalanced data, and this leads to conclude that the adaptive algorithm has higher accuracy than 
the original one. Coming to compare the accuracy all of F-measure, Recall, and ACC revealed 
that the proposed adapted algorithm produced more accurate results (97.16%) than the original 
DeSNN (76.59%). Finally, ADeSNN exhibited higher true positive rate and less false negative 
rate than DeSNN as depicted in Figure 3.5.   
The parameters of the ADeSNN algorithm set in the experiment are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3. 6 The parameter values used in the second experiment 
Neurons and synapses equations 
parameters 
Value Unit 
Excitatory synapse time constant (tau_exc) 2  Ms 
Inhibitory synapse time constant (tau_inh) 5  Ms 
Neuron time constant (tau_mem) 20 Ms 
Membrane leak (El) 20 mV 
Spike threshold (Vthr) 800 mV 
Reset value (Vrst) 0  mV 
Fixed inhibitory weight (winh) 0.20 V 
Fixed excitatory weight (wexc) 0.40 V 
Thermal voltage (UT) 25  mV 
Refractory period (refr) 4  Ms 
SDSP parameters   
Up/Down weight jumps (Vthm) 0.75*Vthr mV 
Calcium variable time constant (tau_ca) 5 *tau mem Ms 
Steady-state asymptote for Calcium 
variable (wca) 
50  mV 
Stop-learning threshold 1 (stop if Vca < 
thk1) 
1.7 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTD if Vca 
> thk2) 
2.2 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTP if Vca 
> thk3) 
8 × (wca–wca) mV 
Plastic synapse (NMDA) time constant 9  Ms 
Plastic synapse high value (wp hi) 6  mV 
Plastic synapse low value (wp lo) 0  mV 
Bistability drift 0.25  
Delta weight 0.12 × wp_hi mV 
Input size 569 spike train  
Simulation time 40  ms 
Default clock unit 0.2 Ms 
Based on the above two experiments, the adaptation on the algorithm gave excellent results 
compared to the original one. The next chapter will build on this adaptation to detect the zero-
day fast flux domains. 
3.5 Chapter Summary: 
This chapter presented our first contribution in adapting the ADeSNN algorithm, and the 
comparison experiments have been conducted on both supervised FFKA algorithm ADeSNN 
and the original DeSNN. The proposed adaptation can be summarized as producing the initial 
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weight of the RO based on the spike time itself rather than the RO initial weight based on the 
ranks of the order of the incoming spikes. The current version has been modified based on the 
changing of the initial weight of the RO, where the initial weight is based on the spike time of 
the incoming spikes, as a results the (mod) variable became useless, which leads that the current 
contribution improved the parameters customization problem.  
Furthermore, two public datasets were used to evaluate the two DeSNN and the adaptive 
ADeSNN algorithms. The first experiment used the IRIS dataset and produced 3-fold cross-
validations, then the average of their result was computed. The results of the experiment showed 
that the adaptive algorithm has enhanced the performance of the DeSNN, where the overall 
accuracy was (91.67%) of the ADeSNN over DeSNN (56%). 
The second experiment exploited the public WDBC dataset and this dataset was randomly 
distributed over 5-fold cross-validations. The average of the results was taken, and several 
accuracy measures were tested, all the discussed results above proved that the performance of 
the adaptive ADeSNN algorithm is better than DeSNN, the overall accuracy of the ADeSNN 
was (97.16%) while the original DeSNN was (76.59%). 
As a result, the contribution presented in the adaptation on the DeSNN algorithm by modifying 
the initial weight mechanism, improves the performance of the algorithm, and achieves better 
results in several ways. The adaptation also minimizes the error rates of the classification 
process, as show in Tables 3.3, respectively. Finally, the exploitation of two other public 
datasets gave comparable results. In chapter four, the new adaptive supervised FFKA frame 
work will be introduced to detect the fast flux domains.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SUPERVISED FAST FLUX KILLER APPROACH FFKA  
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the fast flux killer approach, then introduces the first phase, which is the 
supervised one. FFKA in this phase trains the adaptive dynamic evolving spiking neural 
network and sets the classification threshold. The evaluation of the proposed method is then 
compared with two fast flux detection approaches in the field. Also, this chapter presents the 
new feature set that helps the proposed approach to accurately classify the fast flux domains.  
4.1 Introduction 
According to the achieved enhancement regarding the initial weight described in the chapter 
three, that the proposed adaptation of the DeSNN algorithm improved its performance,  this 
chapter introduces the FFKA which has to be exploited to detect the fast flux domains. FFKA 
works online and offline. In the online mode, FFKA deals with unknown new domains which 
the approach was not trained on in order to detect the zero-day fast flux domains. On the other 
hand, the offline mode deals with labelled data where the supervised learning phase of the FFKA 
will be trained to produce an enhancement in the classification process.  Section 4.2 will present 
the FFKA in both phases: the supervised and the unsupervised. Finally, the rest of this chapter 
will discuss the supervised mode, and the unsupervised mode will be discussed in chapter five 
as a part of the FFKA Hybrid approach. 
4.2 Fast Flux Killer Approach 
ADeSNN was discussed in chapter three in details, this algorithm was designed to work online, 
that means it adapts its' structure and functionality based on the incoming data. FFKA as 
depicted in Figure 4.1, is a Hybrid learning approach that employed two parallel ADeSNN 
algorithms, the former works as supervised in an offline mode and the later works as 
unsupervised in an online mode.  
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To evaluate the proposed supervised FFKA, a public fast flux dataset was used in order to test 
the ability of the ADeSNN algorithm to detect fast flux domains with labeled dataset at the 
supervised phase in an off-line mode to adjust the threshold value of the classification process.  
The supervised mode in FFKA is about training the ADeSNN algorithm on both fast flux 
domains and benign domains. Besides, a threshold of the classification process will be trained 
along the training process. The outputs of the supervised training mode are the final weight and 
the classification threshold, where the weights are stored in the weights repository. Furthermore, 
the threshold stored to be accessed by both the supervised and unsupervised modes later. 
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Figure 4. 1 The architecture of the FFKA 
Figure 4.1 shows the two supervised and unsupervised phases of the FFKA Hybrid approach. 
The first step starts with letting the approach learn how to classify the benign and fast flux 
domains based on labelled data, then stores the output of the ADeSNN algorithm in the weights 
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repository and stores the calculated classification threshold as well. The second unsupervised 
phase that will be discussed in chapter five continues to deal with new unknown unlabeled data. 
The decision here is taken based on the output of phase one, specifically the classification 
threshold. 
4.3 Supervised Learning Phase 
The supervised learning phase as mentioned in section 3.2 trains the classifier used (ADeSNN) 
on labelled data. It also produces the classification ability based on the features of each class. 
Based on this, the discussion here is about the stage of preparing the dataset, the process of the 
feature extraction, and the learning process based on the FFKA supervised phase.      
4.3.1 The Preprocessing Stage 
The fast flux public dataset found as stacks of DNS responses, a script of python was written to 
extract information needed to build the feature set. Some feature needs to contact the ASN to 
get extra information about the IP addresses, and to speed up the process of building the feature 
an ASN repository that is located in the local dive of the approach as depicted in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4. 2 The pre-processing phase 
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4.3.2 Feature Extraction 
This stage is about how to build and calculate some of the features that need calculations. 
Building some features requires extra information from the ASN repository so one of the 
updated and freely downloadable ones was saved into the local drive to speed up the process of 
detection. For example, the number of the ASN for the answer section of the DNS response as 
well as the number of ASN of the additional section in the same DNS response message needs 
extra information from the ASN repository, in this case from the local drive. Another example, 
the similarity feature need to access the same repository to calculate the similarity between the 
autonomous system numbers of the user and the autonomous system numbers of the returned 
IPs. Finally some other features could be taken straight away from the DNS response message.  
4.3.3 Adaptive dynamic evolving spiking neural network 
The trained ADeSNN starts to classify the new upcoming inputs to the proper class benign/fast 
flux, one by one, so for each input the algorithm creates one output neuron, and so on. Moreover, 
the algorithm continues learning from the incoming inputs incrementally. The ADeSNN 
algorithm was discussed in details in section 3.2. 
The criteria of testing and classification of the DeSNN and ADeSNN algorithms was to perform 
the Euclidean distance between the weight of the new input record and the weights of the trained 
inputs. As shown in chapter 3, the results were good so far, but in case of changing this criteria 
to the proposed similarity measure, it is expected that this would give better results than before. 
The similarity criteria is based on the calculation of the similarity between the new input weight 
and the already trained inputs weights according to formula 1 in chapter 4, which is one another 
contributions of this work. Two variables are significantly similar if the similarity between them 
is closest to 1, and they are not similar to each other if their similarity is closest to 0, which 
means that the bigger value refers to highest similarity between the two variables. As there are 
a classification process to classify more than one class, a testing threshold is needed to be set to 
each class, with suitable threshold value that separates all classes. Moreover, the threshold takes 
its value while the training phase is in progress, as each input is classified for one class so the 
threshold of this class is calculated based on the values of the inputs of the specific class.  
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4.4 Dataset 
The proposed adaptation on ADeSNN method has to be evaluated and tested in case of detecting 
fast flux domains, so a public dataset was used in this study (Alvi et al., 2017),which is also 
used in (Huang et al., 2010).The majority of the learning machine approaches such as, the real-
time, active, passive approaches used also the same sources (Castelluccia et al., 2009; C.-M. 
Chen et al., 2013; Holz et al., 2008; Martinez-Bea et al., 2013; Qassrawi & Zhang, 2012; Sheng 
et al., 2010; B. Yu et al., 2014). This dataset consists of DNS responses that were labeled domain 
names as benign and fast flux. The benign domains are selected from the top trusted websites 
like Alexa (Alexa), top blogs as Blogs On Top "BOT". While the fast flux domains are collected 
from the famous fast flux blacklisted websites such as ATLAS ("ATLAS URL: 
https://www.arbornetworks.com/atlas-portal,"), DNSBL ("DNSBL URL: 
https://www.zerobounce.net/,"), and FluXOR (information security expert's detection systems). 
Each record contains the selected feature set that helps to identify each class. Fast flux dataset 
contains (1710) instances, while the benign dataset contains (3420) instances.  
4.5 Feature Selection 
Building detection systems and other classification systems needs to identify the feature or 
attribute set that best describes the problem and the needed solution. Also, these features should 
help in minimizing the irrelevance and redundancy problems, as well as minimizing the false 
correlation and classification of the detection and classification systems. Based on that, feature 
selection methods needs to get released of the irrelevancy and redundancy of the feature set 
without affecting or decreasing the performance (Balepin, Maltsev, Rowe, & Levitt, 2003; 
Giacinto, Roli, & Didaci, 2003; Lee & Stolfo, 2000). 
The embedded model, as one of the main methods that deals with feature selection, joins the 
training phase for particular method E.g., decision tree algorithms, such as C4.5. The algorithm 
selects the greatest feature which is the best for classification. At that time they divided sub-
space based on the carefully chosen feature. The algorithm repeats this process until a certain 
threshold is reached (Boutemedjet, Bouguila, & Ziou, 2009; Jeong, Kang, Jeong, & Kong, 
2012).  
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4.6 Feature Set 
The first stage of the proposed solution is the feature extraction. A well-built fast flux botnet 
detection method should distinguish between a legitimate and malicious network. On the other 
side, a well-built Fast Flux Network (FFN) seems like a benign CDN, due to returning a DNS 
records that belong to the same geographic areas. This leads to a detection systems that depends 
on IP address features to misclassify those types of FFN domains as benign CDNs. In addition, 
the FFN developers are trying to change the characteristics of the fast flux Network to evade 
detection, even if this modification affects the performance of the FFN. Therefore, a new 
detection approach should rely on features belonging to the FFN itself, as these features are not 
prone to change quickly. 
Based on the current fast flux dataset, some of the features used in the proposed solution are 
used before in related works. Moreover, new features are suggested to improve and enhance the 
performance of the classifying process of the fast flux and benign domains. Table 4.1 shows the 
selected features set. 
Table 4. 1 The proposed feature set 
Feature Description New 
feature 
IPans Number of IP addresses in the answer section Not 
NSadd Number of IP addresses in the additional section Not 
NASN_ans Number of ASN for the IP addresses of the answer section Not 
NASN_add Number of ASN for the IP addresses of the additional section Not 
AVGSIM The average of similarity of the ASN (among the answer section 
and the ASN of the victim himself) 
New 
Qtime Time of the query  New 
Msgs Message size  New 
 
Table 4.1 shows the definition of all the feature set. The first two feature are straight forward 
and obtained from the response directly, NASN_ans and NASN_add need to get extra 
information from the local ASN repository as presented in Figure 4.2. AVGSIM is a new feature 
that computes the average of the similarity between the ASN number of the requested IP address 
and the other ASN number of the returned IP addresses of the DNS response. In other words, 
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AVGSIM refers to the average of the similarity between the autonomous system number of the 
user's IP and autonomous system numbers of the proxy bots (compromised computers) returned 
in the answer section of the DNS response, and is computed according to equation (1) 
(Alkhazaleh, Salleh, & Hassan, 2011): 
Mi(𝑦(𝑒) − 𝑥(𝑒)) = 1 −
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑒)−𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑒)
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑒)−𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑒)
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                                          (1) 
Where ẻ is the input vector. It could say that µ(ẻ) and δ(ẻ) are significantly similar if 
M(µ(ẻ),δ(ẻ)) ≥ ½, which means that the bigger value refers to high similarity between the two 
variables.  
The majority of the chosen features were found in the literature work, but the last three features 
are new. In addition, the other two new features are the time of the query and the DNS packet 
size. All these features together showed that their ability to distinguish between the fast flux 
network (served by domains) and the legitimate domains. In the discussion section, these new 
features will be tested to show their effect on the process of classification. Finally, all the feature 
set was put into a feature selection evaluation to show their effectiveness rank on detection 
process.  
4.7 Experiments and Discussion 
This section discusses the experiments made to prove the effects of the proposed similarity 
measure to be used as a classification criteria in order to detect the fast flux domains in 
supervised offline mode. Furthermore, it discusses the feature set proposed from the point of 
view of the influence they affect the process of detection fast flux domains. 
4.7.1 Introduction 
The first part of the FFKA is the supervised learning offline mode. Here one more contribution 
is going to be added to the adaptation proposed on the DeSNN algorithm. In this chapter, the 
FFKA approach based on the ADeSNN algorithm detects the fast flux domains in an offline 
mode by using the fast flux public data set. In addition, the testing criteria in this stage is based 
on the proposed similarity measure in formula 1 in chapter 4. The results of the proposed 
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supervised phase of the FFKA will be evaluated based on a comparison with two of the fast flux 
detection approaches in the same field. 
The feature set has been tested different times via several experiments, especially the new 
proposed features. The results was promising for some feature, at the same time one of the 
feature showed negative effect on the classification process. Thus, our recommendation is to 
exclude this feature from the list in future work. 
4.7.2 Supervised Fast Flux Killer Approach Experiment 
When the feature set became ready, the experiment can start. The supervised learning takes the 
inputs records and feeds them to the ADeSNN algorithm one by one. As the new input record 
has entered a new output neuron is created, at the end of the supervised phase the output neuron 
weight will have the captured pattern of the input records stored as a weighted matrix. 
Furthermore, these output weights will be saved at the weight repository. In addition, the 
threshold value was learning while the supervised phase was in progress, and the final value 
will be stored to be in the next phase of the unsupervised learning phase in order to help in the 
process of classification. Of course, this current supervised phase will classify the input records 
at the end in one of the two classes, the benign domain or fast flux domain. 
The current supervised phase of the approach continuously run in an offline mode, where its 
output will be used in the unsupervised learning phase in an online mode. Periodically, the 
supervised phase re-executed once every 1000 (in the current experiment) new incoming 
domains at the unsupervised online mode. Where the learning this time will be based on the 
new data from the stored inputs from the unsupervised phase, then the threshold tuned to be 
best related to new nature of the new data and helps in the classification process.    
The following discussion is part of the research validation and evaluation processes, which 
presented the comparison between the proposed FFKA and two other approaches from the 
related works (Celik & Oktug, 2013; Lin et al., 2013). A public dataset has been used to test the 
chosen classifiers, then compare their performance among the related previous works done in 
same field. The experiments were conducted using the mentioned fast flux public dataset, to 
test the ability of the proposed approach to solve fast flux problem based on the proposed 
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similarity measure in classification process as well as the proposed fast flux feature set. The 
performance and results of the experiments were promising and indicated an increase in the 
detection accuracy of fast flux domains. 
Three different simulations were implemented on MATLAB and Python platforms. The 
hardware and software used for this experiment are the same as used in the subsection 3.4, two 
of them were selected based on two related previous researches, which is the linear decision 
function in (H.-T. Lin et al., 2013) and the C4.5 in (Celik & Oktug, 2013) algorithm. The third 
was the proposed adaptive ADeSNN based on the new adaptation of the similarity measure and 
the proposed feature set.  
To ensure the quality of the supervised learnning phase of the ADeSNN, a 3-folded cross-
validation method is used to estimate the error rate of the proposed classifier and the other two 
methods as well. Based on this, the average was taken of the linear decision, C4.5, and the 
FFKA classifiers. All the results of the three experiments are presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4. 2 The accuracy measures of the detection algorithms  
Evaluation measures C4.5 Linear Supervised FFKA 
FNR 0.06987 0.03930 0.00000 
FPR 0.05333 0.05333 0.02410 
TPR 0.93013 0.96070 1.00000 
TNR 0.94667 0.94667 0.97590 
ACC 0.93833 0.95374 0.98765 
Precision 0.94667 0.94828 0.97531 
Recall 0.93013 0.96070 1.00000 
F-measure 0.93833 0.95445 0.98750 
MCC 0.87680 0.90755 0.97561 
AUC 0.9383988 0.9536827 0.9879518 
RMSE 0.24834 0.21507 0.11111 
NDEI 0.49641 0.42990 0.22188 
 
According to Lin et al. (2013) a genetic approach was proposed as a real-time detection solution 
of the fast flux domains problem. This method suggested two detection features to classify the 
benign and the flux domains. Firstly, entropy of the domain name (E-DPN) of the preceding 
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node of the flux node (flux-agent), by using the trace route of all the returned IPs from the DNS 
response. Of course, if the E-DPN is high then, most probably, the domain that is classified as 
benign is otherwise classified as fluxed. Secondly, the Standard Deviation of Round Trip Time 
(SD-RTT) between the user and all the return IPs of the flux-agents, so assumed that the scatter 
flux-agent is going to produce high value of the SD-RTT. This spatial feature takes the number 
of different ASNs and number of IPs return in single DNS response in their calculations. 
However, these two detection features were evaded by the botmaster, as botmaster is controlling 
the returned list of IPS that the user receives. The returned list could have IPs in the same ASN 
or adjacent to the user ASN, so the above measures can inaccurately be classified as the benign 
and flux domains. On the other hand, botmaster may return a list containing just a single IP 
address, which leads to ineffective detection of the domains(Hsu et al., 2014; Otgonbold, 2014). 
Although genetic algorithms provide good accuracy as stated in their paper, but in case the 
botmaster decides to return the list of IP addresses in the same AS so the genetic algorithm 
results based on the countermeasures will be affected (Hsu et al., 2014). According to our 
implementations the overall accuracy of the linear classifier is 95.37 % as shown in Figure 4.3. 
Similarly, the linear decision function used as a classifier needs to estimate the categorizer of 
the linear function, so if the estimation is good then the linear function works properly, 
otherwise the error will be high in the classification process (Chahal & Khurana, 2016). So, the 
need for a classifier that detects the zero-day domains is still unsatisfied.  
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Figure 4. 3 The overall detection accuracy 
On the other hand, the second compared algorithm was the C4.5 as presented in (Celik & Oktug, 
2013). A number of feature sets were examined to detect fast flux network, such feature sets 
consist of timing based, spatial based, network based, domain based, and DNS answer based 
feature sets. As mentioned in the literature review, the data set was small even though  the 
accuracy of the experiment was high; also when all features are involved in the experiment the 
prediction results become insensitive to two features (timing and domain based feature sets) 
(Otgonbold, 2014), which is the most related features to the domain resolution process.  
Besides, as C4.5 algorithm is considered as a supervised learning algorithm, it could not be used 
to discover the unknown attacks, especially the zero-day fast flux domains, while the current 
Hybrid FFKA could efficiently detect this kind of domains.  
Moreover, according to our implementation of the C4.5, the accuracy was not high as stated in 
their paper. According to the current experiment it was 93.38%. when this result and the 
previous linear results were compared to the current proposed FFKA, obviously the proposed 
approach overcome the two methods even in this part of the FFKA supervised phase with a total 
detection accuracy of 98.76%. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 showed other accuracy measures which are 
the ROC curve and F-measure, respectively.  
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Figure 4. 4 The area under ROC curve 
 
 
Figure 4. 5  The F measure score 
Figure 4.4 exhibited the area under ROC curve of the three classifiers, as the AUC denotes the 
strength estimator of classifier performance. The proposed ADeSNN proved that it is the best 
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among the others. In addition, Figure 4.5 displayed that the results of the f-measure which 
overcame the other two classifiers C4.5 and the linear decision function. As a result, all those 
measures proved that our contribution of the adaptation revealed that the performance of the 
ADeSNN was enhanced, and leads us to a new version of the spiking neural network that will 
help solve the problem of fast flux domains .Figure 4.6 depicts the error estimation measure 
which is the RMSE.  
 
Figure 4. 6 The root mean square error 
As shown in Figure 4.6 the error measure indicated that the proposed algorithm over performed 
the two other methods by almost 50%, which achieves an enhancement of the misclassified 
instances as RMSE measures the differences between the actual and the estimated targets. So, 
as the FFKA obtained better results, this means that it will be more accurate to deal with 
classification problems in an efficient way. The parameters of the ADeSNN algorithm   set in 
the experiment are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4. 3 The parameters of the ADeSNN algorithm used in the experiment. 
Neurons and synapses equations parameters Value Unit 
Excitatory synapse time constant (tau_exc) 2  Ms 
Inhibitory synapse time constant (tau_inh) 5  Ms 
Neuron time constant (tau_mem) 20 Ms 
Membrane leak (El) 20 mV 
Spike threshold (Vthr) 800 mV 
Reset value (Vrst) 0  mV 
Fixed inhibitory weight (winh) 0.20 V 
Fixed excitatory weight (wexc) 0.40 V 
Thermal voltage (UT) 25  mV 
Refractory period (refr) 4  Ms 
SDSP parameters   
Up/Down weight jumps (Vthm) 0.75*Vthr mV 
Calcium variable time constant (tau_ca) 5 *tau mem Ms 
Steady-state asymptote for Calcium variable (wca) 50  mV 
Stop-learning threshold 1 (stop if Vca < thk1) 1.7 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTD if Vca > thk2) 2.2 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTP if Vca > thk3) 8 × (wca–wca) mV 
Plastic synapse (NMDA) time constant 9  Ms 
Plastic synapse high value (wp hi) 6  mV 
Plastic synapse low value (wp lo) 0  mV 
Bistability drift 0.25  
Delta weight 0.12 × wp_hi mV 
Input size 5130 spike train  
Simulation time 40  ms 
Default clock unit 0.2 Ms 
 
4.7.3 Feature Set Discussion 
The feature set used gave excellent results with the adaptive approach. On the other hand, some 
experiments were performed in order to check the influence of these feature set on the whole 
detection process. Based on that, three experiments were conducted. Every experiment was 
implemented by deleting one of the three new proposed features, keeping the other used features 
the same for the all experiments. The results of these experiments are illustrated in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4. 4 The results of the three experiments by eliminating one new feature at a time. 
 The three Experiments without feature of  
Evaluation 
measures 
AVGSIM Qtime  Msgs 
ADeSNN(ALL) 
FNR 0 0 0 0 
FPR 0.283950617 0 0.209876543 0.02410 
TPR 1 1 1 1 
TNR 0.716049383 1 0.790123457 0.97590 
ACC 0.858024691 1 0.895061728 0.98765 
Precision 0.716049383 1 0.790123457 0.97531 
Recall 1 1 1 1 
F-Measure 0.834532374 1 0.882758621 0.98750 
MCC 0.746787994 1 0.808122036 0.97561 
RMSE 0.37679611 0 0.323941772 0.11111 
NDEI 0.752428371 0 0.646882951 0.22188 
MSE 0.141975309 0 0.104938272 0.01235 
According to Table 4.4, the first experiment eliminated the feature (AVGSIM) from the feature 
set, then implemented the ADeSNN algorithm on the other sixth features, the accuracy was 
almost about 85.8%. Comparing this results with the others it is clear that implementing the 
algorithm while excluding this feature will give low detection rate, so this indicates that the 
AVGSIM played important role in classifying the input instances, as depicted in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4. 7 The accuracy comparison between the feature set experiments 
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By looking at the results of the second experiment shown in the Figure 4.7, it is obvious that 
the detection rate reached 100%. Which tells us that this feature (Qtime) affects badly on the 
classification process. In addition, the 3rd experiment that was implemented without the message 
size showed an accuracy of nearly 89.5%. Actually, this is adequate as the experiment ran 
including Qtime feature, which seemed the worst feature among them all. The last column in 
Table 4.4 showed the result of the ADeSNN algorithm with all features included. Here we can 
say that the accuracy of 98.76% is excellent, considering Qtime was one of its features.   
The root Mean Square Error was also computed for all three experiments. Figure 4.8 shows that 
the experiment excluded the average similarity feature was the highest RMSE value. This 
proves that the average similarity feature is important to the classification process, while its 
absence will increase the number of misclassified results.  On the other hand, the query time 
feature showed bad results, where the absence of this feature gave 0 value for RMSE, which is 
excellent for the classification process as no instances will be missed. 
Finally, the combination of the features together, even with including the query time feature, 
still produces good results, as depicted in Figure 4.8.  
 
Figure 4. 8 The RMSE of the feature set experiment 
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Another test was implemented to prove the quality of the feature set was the feature selection 
method based on the decision tree (Alauthaman, Aslam, Zhang, Alasem, & Hossain, 2016; Kira 
& Rendell, 1992), for more details about the feature selection method see section 4.5. Table 4.5 
shows the result of the current feature set. 
Table 4. 5 The features set ranking importance 
Feature Important rate 
Msgs 100 
IPans 4.01 
AVGSIM 3.45 
NSadd 1.94 
NASN_ans 1.75 
NASN_add 1.13 
Qtime 0.58 
 
 
Figure 4. 9 Feature set ranking based on the feature selection method 
 
According to the result of the features selection method in Figure 4.9, the results emphasized 
the previous results regarding feature quality, and indicated that Qtime is the least important 
feature among the selected and proposed features. Also, the AVGSIM came in the third position, 
and this shows its importance compared to the other features. 
100
4.013.451.941.751.130.58
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
MsgsIPansAVGSIMNSaddNASN_ansNASN_addQtime
R
an
k
Features
Feature set rank based on the Feature selection 
method
97 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter displayed the enhancement of the proposed supervised FFKA by exploiting 
ADeSNN to detect the fast flux domains in offline mode. The purpose of this chapter was to 
show the improvement in the performance of the FFKA approach based on the similarity 
measure used to classify the fast flux domain and the benign domains, as well as the feature set 
that facilitated the classification process. 
In order to evaluate the proposed adaptation of the supervised FFKA phase, a public fast flux 
dataset was used. Three experiments were conducted, the first was the proposed supervised 
phase of the FFKA and the other two methods were chosen from the same field of the fast flux 
detection approaches, the linear decision function and C4.5 classifiers.  
The discussion started with the stages of preparing the dataset and the process of the feature 
extraction. The fast flux public dataset found that as stacks of DNS responses, a script of python 
was written to extract the features and store it in a secondary database, and then began building 
and calculating some of the features that needed calculations. A local copy of the ASN database 
was also used to speed up the process of IP address information retrieval. 
The feature set of the all three experiments was tested using the feature selection method, this 
later used a decision tree to rank the importance of the features on board. The proposed three 
features have been tested as well, the Qtime feature showed the worse influence on the 
classification and detection processes. In contrast, the average similarity feature has the best 
influence on the classification process. Another experiment proved the same results: the three 
proposed features were tested in three different experiments. Each experiment has to delete one 
of these three features and record the result of the classification. At the end of the experiment 
the results had the same indication of the feature selection method. 
The supervised phase trained the ADeSNN to detect the fast flux domains. The output of the 
supervised phase was the final weights and the classification threshold, where the weights stored 
at the weight repository, as well as the classification threshold. Moreover, the weight repository 
and the threshold helped to save more memory storage as no need to store all inputs forever, 
just a particular space to store a certain number of inputs is required.   
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The results of the FFKA were compared with linear decision function and C4.5 classifiers from 
the previous related works. Overall, the performance of the FFKA over perform both of them 
based on previously discussed accuracy measures. Overall, the current results based on the 
comparisons have made were promising to move forward and added a value to the process of 
fast flux domains detection. Where the Overall accuracy of the FFKA to detect fast flux domains 
was (98.76%).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HYBRID FAST FLUX KILLER APPROACH  
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the two parts of the fast flux killer approach namely the supervised and 
the unsupervised phases. The supervised phase trains the adaptive dynamic evolving spiking 
neural network at the beginning, sets the classification threshold, and stores the weights in the 
weights repository. The unsupervised phase detects and classifies the zero-day domains based 
on the output of the supervised phase. The evaluation of the proposed FFKA approach in this 
chapter is then compared with supervised phase results presented in chapter four. The result will 
be discussed at the end of this chapter.  
5.1 Introduction 
The improvements presented the last two chapters were substantial based on the enhanced 
performance obtained from the ADeSNN algorithm. The improvements enhanced the 
performance of the algorithm in different ways. Improvements were observed in the initial 
weights, the similarity classification measure, and the features set. Other slight improvements 
made over the ADeSNN algorithm focused on the parameter customization problem, which was 
discussed a part of the parameters adjustment.  
There is confusion in the community about the meaning of online detection. The offline 
detection approaches for example trained on data once and started to detect the incoming data. 
If, however, some of the new data kept changing, problems may occur.  This leads us to search 
for a new model which is trained on offline dataset and adapts itself for the new incoming data, 
which is called the online model. In our field, online is concerned with dealing with the new 
fast flux domain threats once seen. 
The proposed FFKA approach deals with two phases in order to detect the fast flux domains, 
the first is the supervised learning phase which works offline and train the approach to detect 
fast flux domains, while the second is unsupervised learning phase which works online and 
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based on the output of the supervised phase, the online learning mode will be able to detect the 
zero-day fast flux domains.    
5.2 The Hybrid Fast Flux Killer Approach (Supervised and unsupervised) 
5.2.1 Introduction 
At this chapter the FFKA will be discussed in details and this include the supervised and 
unsupervised phases. We will look at the full life cycle of the FFKA starting from the setting of 
the bases of the approach at the supervised phase, until the detection of zero-day fast flux 
domains at the unsupervised phase. Then, a comparison between the output of the supervised 
phase described in  chapter four and the output of the Hybrid approach described in this chapter 
will be performed. 
5.2.2 The FFKA Supervised Phase 
In chapter four, we discussed the supervised process in detail.  The Supervised phase deals with 
labelled data, while the process of learning is in progress and the classification threshold is 
being set. As the process of learning reaches the end, the output of this phase will be the final 
weights of the output spiking neurons and the classification threshold. The weights are stored 
in the weights repository and the threshold will be saved as well.  
5.2.3 The FFKA Unsupervised Phase 
In this section the unsupervised phase will be introduced as part of the FFKA approach.  The 
following sections describe the whole unsupervised phase in details. 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
This is the second phase of the proposed FFKA approach, called the unsupervised learning 
phase. This phase deals with new instances (domains), so that the unsupervised learning part of 
the approach will be able to deal with unknown data, in our case the zero-day fast flux domains. 
The classification process will be based on the output of the previous supervised phase as it will 
be described later on in this chapter. 
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5.2.3.2 The Preprocessing Stage 
The preprocessing stage of the dataset from the DNS responses was introduced in detail in 
section 4.3.1, the dataset will be prepared, as it will be fed to the unsupervised learning phase 
one by one.  
5.2.3.3 Feature Extraction 
This stage is about how to build and calculate some of the features that need calculations. As 
discussed in details in section 4.3.2, some features need to be calculated based on extra 
information provided from a third-party database and some other features could be taken 
straight away from the DNS response message.  
5.2.3.4 Hybrid Fast Flux Killer Approach 
The two phases of the supervised and the unsupervised learning phases were combined together 
in order to achieve the main goal of the research, which is the detection of the zero-day fast flux 
domains in an online mode. 
The FFKA approach started with the supervised phase to set the basic seeds of the classification 
process, then begins the online detection mode to detect the zero-day fast flux domains. After 
this phase, the supervised learning offline mode is re-executed once again to refine the 
classification criteria. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the supervised phase receives the labelled inputs one by one and builds 
the spiking neural network based on the ADeSNN algorithm. As more inputs kept coming the 
spiking neural network becomes bigger and its learning from the inputs produces the final 
weights matrix. Subsequently, for each input record there is an output neuron created to capture 
the input pattern along the learning process. At the end of this phase all the output neurons' 
weights were stored in the weights repository. Furthermore, during the learning process, the 
classification threshold was computed to be used in the classification process, which is based 
on the similarity measure.   
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The unsupervised mode deals with unlabeled data and the ADeSNN algorithm will capture the 
features of the domains, then trains the ADeSNN on the new inputs.  the algorithm will then 
accessed the classification threshold stored from the supervised phase to classify the unknown 
domains. While the new un-labelled records are trained by the ADeSNN in an online mode, the 
final weights became ready to be stored in the weights repository.  
The new weights of the new input records stored at the weights repository will be used later 
after certain number of records and time.  In our case after 1000 records, in supervised learning 
again to enhance the classification threshold value as the new inputs become part of the training 
dataset of the supervised phase. This process is depicted in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5. 1 The Hybrid FFKA 
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The weight repository and the classification threshold helped to save on the memory storage, as 
there is no need to store all incoming inputs forever but just the specified space to store certain 
number of inputs is required (1000 records in this case). 
5.3 Dataset 
The proposed modification on ADeSNN method has to be evaluated and tested by exploiting 
the public fast flux dataset as discussed in section 4.4.  
5.4 Feature Set 
A public fast flux data set was used as discussed in section 4.4. So, the feature set proposed here 
is the same as the one proposed in section 4.6. The seven features remain the same for 
comparison purposes.  
5.5 Experiment and Discussion  
Both supervised and unsupervised learning phases are now working at the same time, in the first 
step the supervised model will train the algorithm on the fast flux data then produce the seeds 
of the classification process to the next step. The second step, the unsupervised learning phase 
deals with the new input records and executes the algorithm to produce the final weights then 
uses the first step results to help the unsupervised phase to classify the new incoming inputs if 
they are fast flux domains, especially the zero-day fast flux domains. 
To achieve that, the public fast flux data set was exploited in order to evaluate the Hybrid FFKA 
approach and compare the achieved results with the results of the supervised phase alone in 
chapter four. A 3-folded cross-validation is used and three experiments were conducted for this 
purpose. Based on that, each experiment in the first two folds is used in the supervised learning 
to train ADeSNN in the offline mode. While the third fold was fed into the unsupervised 
learning in an online mode.  
At the supervised phase of the approach the first two folds are used to train the ADeSNN 
algorithm on the benign and fast flux domains, while the running of the spiking neural network 
the initial weights are updated according to the new inputs, and the final weights of the 
supervised phase will be stored at the weights repository. At the same time, the classification 
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threshold trained to classify both the benign and the fast flux domains while training, and the 
final value of the threshold stored will be used by the next step at the unsupervised phase. 
The third fold was fed to the unsupervised phase as un-labelled data inputs, so the algorithm of 
ADeSNN will execute the spiking neural network and produces the final weights of those 
inputs, the unsupervised phase has an access to the classification threshold produced from the 
supervised phase and will be used to classify the new inputs. Then, the new weights are 
added/replaced in the weights repository.  
For every 1000 new input records the approach will re-train the supervised phase on the weights 
stored in the weights repository to enhance the classification threshold. This leads to the fact 
that the proposed approach will update its classification ability based on the changing of the 
input upon time. Which give the approach the lifelong workability, as the functionality adapts 
to the new changes in the form of what the fast flux domains might do.  
5.5.1 The Results of the Hybrid FFKA 
Based on the three experiments mentioned in section 5.5, the hybrid FFKA approach worked 
offline and online in a hybrid mode to detect the fast flux domains in offline mode and trained 
the FFKA approach to the zero-day fast flux domains in online mode. The average of the three 
experiments’ results are displayed in Table 5.1.  
Table 5. 1 Results of the hybrid FFKA 
Evaluation measures Hybrid FFKA 
FNR 0.00% 
FPR 0.59% 
TPR 100.00% 
TNR 99.41% 
ACC 99.54% 
Precision 99.41% 
Recall 100.00% 
F-measure 99.71% 
MCC 98.67% 
RMSE 6.78% 
NDEI 13.55% 
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According to the results displayed in Table 5.1 the approach accurately classifies the benign 
domains with a true positive rate of 100%. Additionally, the approach classified the fast flux 
domains with false positive rate of (0.59%). All the accuracy measures of the detection approach 
results were displayed in Table 5.1. The error results are displayed in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5. 2 The results of the hybrid FFKA 
 
Figure 5.2 displays the results of the hybrid FFKA approach where the error estimators shows 
that the approach was able to minimize the number of misclassified instances based on the new 
contributed enhancements.  
The set on parameters used in this experiment is shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5. 2 Parameters used in the hybrid experiment 
Neurons and synapses equations parameters Value Unit 
Excitatory synapse time constant (tau_exc) 2  Ms 
Inhibitory synapse time constant (tau_inh) 5  Ms 
Neuron time constant (tau_mem) 20 Ms 
Membrane leak (El) 20 mV 
Spike threshold (Vthr) 800 mV 
Reset value (Vrst) 0  mV 
Fixed inhibitory weight (winh) 0.20 V 
Fixed excitatory weight (wexc) 0.40 V 
Thermal voltage (UT) 25  mV 
Refractory period (refr) 4  Ms 
SDSP parameters   
Up/Down weight jumps (Vthm) 0.75*Vthr mV 
Calcium variable time constant (tau_ca) 5 *tau mem Ms 
Steady-state asymptote for Calcium variable 
(wca) 
50  mV 
Stop-learning threshold 1 (stop if Vca < thk1) 1.7 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTD if Vca > 
thk2) 
2.2 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTP if Vca > 
thk3) 
8 × (wca–wca) mV 
Plastic synapse (NMDA) time constant 9  Ms 
Plastic synapse high value (wp hi) 6  mV 
Plastic synapse low value (wp lo) 0  mV 
Bistability drift 0.02  
Delta weight 0.12 × wp_hi mV 
Input size 5130 spike train  
Simulation time 40  ms 
Default clock unit 0.2 Ms 
 
Overall, the Hybrid FFKA approach proved its ability to detect the zero-day fast flux domains in 
the online mode where the total accuracy achieved was 99.54%, and enhanced the classification 
accuracy in offline mode periodically. 
5.5.2 Comparison of Supervised and Hybrid approach 
In chapter 4, the supervised FFKA approach was introduce to train the approach in detecting the 
fast flux domain and produced and enhanced (later) the classification threshold of the 
unsupervised phase.  
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The following discussion is about the comparison between the supervised FFKA approach phase 
from chapter 5 and the hybrid (supervised and unsupervised) FFKA approach. A public dataset 
was used to test the chosen classifiers in section 4.4. Three experiments were conducted using 
the mentioned fast flux public dataset to test the ability of the proposed FFKA approach to solve 
fast flux domains problem. The performance and the results of the experiments were promising 
and indicated an increase in the detection accuracy of fast flux domains. To ensure the quality of 
the learnning phase of the ADeSNN, a 3-folded cross-validation method is used to estimate the 
error rate of the algorithm. The three experiments were implemented then the average has been 
taken. Table 5.3 summarizes the results obtained in this experiments those obtained from the 
experiments in chapter 4. 
Table 5. 3 The comparison results of supervised and hybrid FFKA approach 
Evaluation measures Supervised FFKA Hybrid FFKA 
FNR 0.00% 0.00% 
FPR 2.41% 0.59% 
TPR 100.00% 100.00% 
TNR 97.59% 99.41% 
ACC 98.77% 99.54% 
Precision 97.53% 99.41% 
Recall 100.00% 100.00% 
F-measure 98.75% 99.71% 
MCC 97.56% 98.67% 
RMSE 11.11% 6.78% 
NDEI 22.19% 13.55% 
 
Table 5.3 shows the result of the comparison between the supervised phase experiment from 
chapter 4 and the hybrid FFKA experiment discussed in section 5.5.1. 
By looking at the results, both sides shared the same achievement in detecting the benign 
domains where the detection rate of the benign domains was 100%. But, in the case of detecting 
the fast flux domains the hybrid approach performs better than the supervised phase result to 
achieve a detection rate of 99.41% while the supervised achieved 97.59%. Other measures were 
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also used as shown in Table 5.3 and include Precision, Recall, F-measure, and MCC.  All the 
measures show that the hybrid approach outperforms the supervised one. 
Figure 5.3 displays the compared graph that shows all the measures in both the supervised 
experiment and the hybrid FFKA approach experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 Comparison of the supervised and hybrid FFKA approaches 
 
In the case of the error estimator's performance, RMSE and NDEI exhibited an improvement in 
their values compared to the same in the supervised phase, which leads to conclude that the 
percentage of an error in misclassifying the normal and fast flux domains decreased in the 
hybrid approach, as depicted in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5. 4 The error comparison of the supervised and hybrid FFKA approach 
Overall, the proposed contribution of the hybrid FFKA approach improved the detection 
accuracy and ability to detect the fast flux domains and especially the zero-day fast flux domains 
in online mode. Furthermore, the Precision and F-measure showed an enhancement in their 
values compared to the last experiment results. We conclude that the detection accuracy of the 
proposed hybrid FFKA approach has improved the ability of the ADeSNN algorithm to classify 
the incoming inputs more correctly than before. 
5.5.3 Parameter Adjustment and Customization 
The algorithm of the DeSNN suffers from the many parameters needed to be set before running 
the algorithm. Our adaptive ADeSNN modifies the process of the initial weight setting, so this 
adaptation added a value in the parameters customization problem by excluding the (Mod) 
parameter as shown in section 3.4. According to (Kasabov et al., 2013) the best values of the 
parameters were given in their research is the same as those shown in Table 5.4 and the same 
parameters are used in the current research for the sake of consistency and comparison purposes. 
However, the best results obtained were based on the parameters’ values of the current research 
as displayed in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5. 4  The parameters values of the ADeSNN algorithm in FFKA approach 
Neurons and synapses equations parameters Value Unit 
Excitatory synapse time constant (tau_exc) 2  Ms 
Inhibitory synapse time constant (tau_inh) 5  Ms 
Neuron time constant (tau_mem) 20 Ms 
Membrane leak (El) 20 mV 
Spike threshold (Vthr) 800 mV 
Reset value (Vrst) 0  mV 
Fixed inhibitory weight (winh) 0.20 V 
Fixed excitatory weight (wexc) 0.40 V 
Thermal voltage (UT) 25  mV 
Refractory period (refr) 4  Ms 
SDSP parameters   
Up/Down weight jumps (Vthm) 0.75*Vthr mV 
Calcium variable time constant (tau_ca) 5 *tau mem Ms 
Steady-state asymptote for Calcium variable 
(wca) 
50  mV 
Stop-learning threshold 1 (stop if Vca < thk1) 1.7 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTD if Vca > 
thk2) 
2.2 × wca mV 
Stop-learning threshold 2 (stop LTP if Vca > 
thk3) 
8 × (wca–wca) mV 
Plastic synapse (NMDA) time constant 9  Ms 
Plastic synapse high value (wp hi) 6  mV 
Plastic synapse low value (wp lo) 0  mV 
Bistability drift 0.02  
Delta weight 0.12 × wp_hi mV 
Input size 5130 spike train  
Simulation time 40  ms 
Default clock unit 0.2 Ms 
 
5.6 chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the main proposed contribution, which is the Fast Flux Killer Approach 
or FFKA. The improvements made in chapter 3 and chapter 4 were substantial according to the 
enhancements in the performance of the ADeSNN algorithm. This chapter introduced the hybrid 
FFKA approach that worked offline to train the approach and initialize the classification 
threshold, and online to detect the zero-day fast flux domains based on the threshold value that 
was set by the supervised phase. 
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The same fast flux public dataset used in chapter 4 was used in the current chapter. Furthermore, 
a 3 fold cross-validation was used, as the experiments were conducted in the two chapters were 
then compared according to various accuracy measures and error estimators. The result proved 
that the enhancement of the hybrid FFKA approach over the supervised phase alone in both the 
accuracy measures where the total accuracy achieved was 99.54, and the error estimators 
showed that the hybrid approach had lower error values in misclassifying the domains. 
This chapter also discussed the parameter customization problem, by reducing the number of 
parameters used in the algorithm, for example the (Mod) parameter used in RO initial weight 
calculations, but it became useless as the new proposed approach used the spike time as initial 
weight.  
Finally, the parameters adjustment was discussed. A comparison between the adaptive version 
of the algorithm introduced in chapter 4 and the current modification in this chapter was 
implemented, then we discussed the improvements of the performance of the algorithm based 
on the same parameters values, as introduced in the original DeSNN as mentioned in algorithm 
3.1(Kasabov et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter summaries the whole research conducted in this study and give some directions 
for future researchers to guide them in detecting the fast flux domains as well as improving the 
performance of the proposed methodology.  
 
6.1 Discussion 
This thesis discussed the process of detecting fast flux botnet based on a novel proposed FFKA. 
Starting from the title the thesis treated two tracks, the fast flux botnet detection and the 
adaptation of the DeSNN algorithm. Hence, the structure of the thesis was built to develop the 
adaptation process first, then use the proposed adaptive algorithm to detect the fast flux problem.  
Based on that, chapter one discussed the fundamentals of the thesis (where the research identified 
the gap in the knowledge), the motivation of the research, the main aim and the objectives, the 
methodology of the solution, and the contribution of the proposed research were discussed as 
well. Chapter two revealed a solid background that covers the subject of the thesis, discussed the 
literature review, and examined the related work done so far in the same field. 
In chapter three, two public datasets were used to evaluate the proposed adaptation on the DeSNN 
and compared the results with original DeSNN itself. DeSNN algorithm is built based on both 
the RO learning rules and the SDSP learning rules. According to previous work, the initial weight 
of the DeSNN is calculated based on the RO rules. As stated in (Kasabov et al., 2013), the output 
of the DeSNN algorithm consists of the initial and final weight matrices, as a new incoming input 
pattern arrives, an initial weight and final weight are computed. Then, the updates happened while 
running the algorithm on the initial weight. At the recall mode the classification of the new arrival 
is going to be based on testing the similarity measure, which is Euclidean distance in this research. 
Experiments showed that the current initial weight based on the RO setting introduces a clear 
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misclassification percentage of detecting the incoming inputs. So, the contribution here was to 
use the spike time as initial weight and the results obtained were satisfactory. The overall 
accuracy of DeSNN was (56%) while it was (91.67%) for ADeSNN using on the IRIS dataset. 
According to the IRIS dataset two classes were non-linearly separable which cause to show 
almost 91% accuracy while it was tested on the first linearly separable classes and give 100% 
accuracy. This leads to the ability of the adaptive DeSNN to classify classes even when inputs 
are mutually mixed. Finally, ADeSNN exhibited higher true positive rate and less false negative 
rate than DeSNN.  
For the second public WDBC dataset, the experiment distributed the dataset into 5-fold cross-
validations groups. So, five separated experiments were done, where the instances randomly 
distributed on the five groups, then the results were computed and the average was taken. It is 
noted that the error measures (RSME, NDEI, and MSE-ERROR) values of the proposed adaptive 
ADeSNN were less than those for the original DeSNN, which means the adaptation on the 
DeSNN will minimize the misclassification of the input instances, and maximize the accuracy of 
the detection and classification. In addition, the MCC is a performance metric which is widely 
used in bioinformatics. The two algorithms used this metric as it best deals with imbalanced data, 
and this leads the researcher to conclude that the adaptive algorithm is more accurate than the 
original one. Coming to compare the accuracy, the F-measure, Recall, and ACC revealed that the 
proposed adaptation produced more accurate results (97.16%) than the original DeSNN 
(76.59%). Finally, ADeSNN exhibited higher true positive rate and less false negative rate than 
DeSNN. Overall, all the measures used proved the improvement of the performance of the 
proposed adaptive algorithm. 
According to the achieved enhancement in chapter three, which showed that the proposed 
adaptation on the DeSNN algorithm improved its performance. In chapter four, FFKA was 
tested in order to detect the fast flux domains in an online mode. The proposed FFKA consists 
of two parts, the supervised and unsupervised learning modes. The supervised ADeSNN in 
FFKA is about training the ADeSNN algorithm on both fast flux domains and benign domains. 
Besides, a threshold of the classification process will be trained along the training process. The 
outputs of the supervised training mode are the final weight and the classification threshold, 
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where the weights are stored in the weights repository. Furthermore, the threshold stored to be 
accessed by both the supervised and un-supervised modes later. The un-supervised mode deals 
with new unknown data, so the ADeSNN algorithm will capture the features of the domains, 
then access the value of the classification threshold to classify the inputs domains, then the final 
weights of the new inputs are calculated. The weights of the new input records then will be 
stored in the weights repository to be used later after certain (number of records/ time) in 
supervised learning mode again to enhance the classification threshold value as the new inputs 
become part of the training dataset. The weight repository and the threshold helped to save 
memory storage as there is no need to store all inputs forever, but just the specified space to 
store certain number if inputs is required.   
Also, the contribution made over the ADeSNN algorithm focused on the testing criteria where 
the current research implemented the similarity measure defined by formula 1 in chapter 4, 
which according to the best of my knowledge, it is the first time this formula has been used in 
this field. Furthermore, chapter discussed the parameter customization problem by reducing the 
number of parameters for example the (Mod) parameter used before with the initial weight 
calculations. 
To achieve that, a comparison between the proposed algorithm and two other approaches from  
the works developed in (Celik & Oktug, 2013; H.-T. Lin et al., 2013) were implemented. A 
public dataset has been used to test the chosen classifiers, then compares their performance 
among the related previous works developed in same field. Three experiments were conducted 
using the mentioned fast flux public dataset, to test the ability of the proposed algorithm to solve 
the fast flux problem. Two of them were selected based on two related previous researches, the 
linear decision function in (H.-T. Lin et al., 2013) and the C4.5 in (Celik & Oktug, 2013) 
algorithm. The third was the supervised FFKA. To ensure the quality of the learnning phase of 
the ADeSNN, a 3-folded cross-validation method is used to estimate the error rate of the three 
classifiers. The three experiments were implemented then the average has been taken. 
According to the implementations the overall accuracy of the linear classifier was (95.37 %). In 
addition, the linear decision function used as a classifier needs to estimate the categorizer of the 
linear function, to see if the estimation is good and the linear function work properly, otherwise 
the error will be high in the classification process. Besides, as C4.5 algorithm is considered as 
115 
 
a supervised learning algorithm, it could not be used to discover the unknown attacks especially 
the zero-day fast flux domains. Moreover, according to the implementation, the accuracy was 
not high as stated in their paper at 93.38%. When this result and the previous linear results were 
compared to the current proposed ADeSNN, it shows that the proposed approach outperforms 
the two methods with a total detection accuracy of 98.76%. Other accuracy measures have also 
been implemented. 
The feature set proposed by the current thesis consists of several features, where three of them 
are for the best of our knowledge the first time to be used in the field. AVGSIM is a new feature 
that computes the average of the similarity between the ASN number of the requested IP address 
and the other ASN number of the returned IP addresses of the DNS response. In other words, 
AVGSIM refers to the average of the similarity between the autonomous system number of the 
user's IP and autonomous system numbers of the proxy bots returned in the answer section of 
the DNS response, and is computed using formula 1 in chapter 4. The other two new features 
are the time of the query and the DNS packet size. All these features together showed their 
ability to distinguish between the fast flux network (served by domains) and the legitimate 
domains. The feature set used gave excellent results with the adaptive approach. Further 
experiments were conducted to check the influence of these feature set on the whole detection 
process. Based on that, three experiments were conducted, every experiment is implemented by 
deleting one of the new three features with keeping the other used features the same for the all 
experiments. According to feature evaluation results, the first experiment eliminated the feature 
(AVGSIM) from the feature set, then implemented the ADeSNN algorithm on the other six 
features, the accuracy was about 85.8%. Comparing this result with the others it is clearly that 
implementing the algorithm with excluding this feature will give low detection rate, so this 
indicate that the AVGSIM played an important role in classifying the input instances. By 
reading the results of the second feature experiment, it was noted that the detection rate reached 
100%. This tells us that the feature (Qtime) badly affects the classification process. In addition, 
the 3rd experiment showed an accuracy of almost 89.5% which is actually good enough as the 
experiment ran includs the Qtime feature. The last column in Table 4.4 showed the result of the 
ADeSNN algorithm with all features included. Here we can say that the accuracy of 98.77 is 
excellent, considering it had Qtime as one of its features.  
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Another test was implemented to prove the quality of the feature set was the feature selection 
method based on  decision trees (Alauthaman et al., 2016; Kira & Rendell, 1992), the result of 
the features selection method emphasized the previous results regarding the Qtime feature. In 
short, Qtime is the least important feature among the selected features. The AVGSIM came in 
the third position during this test, and this shows its importance among the other features. 
Chapter five discussed the main proposed contribution which is the Fast Flux Killer Approach 
FFKA. In chapter 3 and chapter 4 many improvements were proposed and proved their 
enhancements in the performance of the ADeSNN algorithm. This chapter introduced the hybrid 
FFKA approach that worked offline to train the approach and initialize the classification 
threshold, and worked online to detect the zero-day fast flux domains based on the threshold 
value that was set by the supervised phase. These two supervised and unsupervised phases play 
important roles in enhancing the detection performance of the proposed approach to detect the 
fast flux domains and especially the zero-day domains, as the approach re-trained the algorithm 
based on the old and the new data. This gives the approach the ability to adapt itself to whatever 
new changes the fast flux domains will implement to evade detection.  
The same fast flux public dataset used in chapter 4 was used in the chapter 5. A 3 fold cross-
validation was used as the experiments that were conducted in the two chapters and had their 
results compared according to various accuracy measures and error estimators. The result 
proved the the enhancement of the hybrid FFKA approach over the supervised phase alone in 
both the accuracy measures where the total accuracy achieved was 99.54, and the error 
estimators showed that the hybrid approach had lower error values in misclassified the domains. 
Overall, the proposed adaptation and modification have improved the performance of the 
original algorithm and obtained better classification results. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Work 
The DeSNN algorithm suffers from the fact that many parameters have to be set before running 
it. The proposed contribution of this work has partially solved this problem, but still there are 
many parameters that need to be set. It is clear that the problem of fast flux is not solved and it 
needs several efforts to be gathered together at different levels. Governmental, private sector, 
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and research efforts have to be implemented and coordinated. This is because of the need to 
acquire a real-time dataset for a long period of time, and ensure that the dataset is controlled 
and tested correctly.  
The suggested future work for saving more memory usage could be the use of fuzzy rules to be 
saved instead of the weight matrices, as each current cluster is dedicated for one weight matrix. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Botnets have expanded radically and is an interesting research field that concerns expertise 
based on the threats that it provided, fast flux botnets offer a bridge to carry other malicious 
threats such as DDoS, internet fraud, and identity thief. Although several methods have been 
suggested for detecting fast flux domains, they still have low detection accuracy, especially with 
the zero-day domain, quite a long detection time, and consume high memory storage.  
The main contribution of this study is to come out with a approach for the detection and 
classification of fast flux domains. So, we proposed a new approach called Fast Flux Killer 
Approach (FFKA) that has the ability to detect FF-Domains, especially the zero-day domains 
in online mode, with an implementation constructed on Adaptive Dynamic evolving Spiking 
Neural Network (ADeSNN). The proposed approach proved its ability to detect fast flux 
domains with high detection accuracy according to the experiments have implemented.  
The aspects were considered and addressed in this study has contributed scientifically to the 
field in many ways. Most of previous studies in the fast flux domains detection field were based 
on machine learning algorithms, stand-alone approaches, and network monitoring. The research 
was conducted through its contributions as presented in section 1.6 as follows.  
 The first and second objectives were developed as described in chapters 3. The 
contribution focused on increasing the detection performance using adaptive fast one-
pass algorithm (ADeSNN). By employing the spike time as initial weight, then the 
achieved performance evaluated according to true positive, true negative, recall, 
precision, f-Measure and overall accuracy. 
118 
 
 The third and fourth objective was also achieved with the proposed supervised FFKA 
approach phase as described in chapter 4. This contribution represents the most 
important part of this research that aimed to improve the detection accuracy, especially 
the classification criteria by conducting the similarity measure between the new and 
already trained inputs. Also, design of a new feature set which can be used with 
suggested algorithm to accurately classify fast flux domains. 
 The fifth and sixth contributions were developed in chapter 4. Where a proposed Hybrid 
FFKA method was proposed based on an adaptive life-long learning approach able to 
detect dynamically the unknown zero-day fast flux domains in online mode and enhance 
the classification process in offline mode. Also, a new adaptive dynamic classification 
threshold was introduced in order to classify new incoming inputs, as well as minimize 
the memory storage used. 
This comparisons stated that the proposed approach outperformed the other recently developed 
approaches. Three public datasets are exploited in the experiments to show the effects of the 
adaptation of the DeSNN algorithm, a high detection accuracy achieved of detecting fast flux 
domains especially the zero-day domains was about (99.54%) in an online mode.  
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Gržnić, T., Perhoč, D., Marić, M., Vlašić, F., & Kulcsar, T. (2014). CROFlux—Passive DNS method for 
detecting fast-flux domains. Paper presented at the Information and Communication 
Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2014 37th International Convention on. 
Gu, G., Perdisci, R., Zhang, J., & Lee, W. (2008). BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for 
Protocol-and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection. Paper presented at the USENIX Security 
Symposium. 
Hagras, H., Pounds-Cornish, A., Colley, M., Callaghan, V., & Clarke, G. (2004). Evolving spiking neural 
network controllers for autonomous robots. Paper presented at the Robotics and Automation, 
2004. Proceedings. ICRA'04. 2004 IEEE International Conference on. 
Holz, T., Gorecki, C., Rieck, K., & Freiling, F. C. (2008). Measuring and Detecting Fast-Flux Service 
Networks. Paper presented at the NDSS. 
Horng-Tzer, W., Ching-Hao, M., Kuo-Ping, W., & Hahn-Ming, L. (2012, 16-20 July 2012). Real-Time Fast-
Flux Identification via Localized Spatial Geolocation Detection. Paper presented at the 
Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 2012 IEEE 36th Annual. 
Hsu, C.-H., Huang, C.-Y., & Chen, K.-T. (2010). Fast-Flux Bot Detection in Real Time. In S. Jha, R. Sommer, 
& C. Kreibich (Eds.), Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (Vol. 6307, pp. 464-483): Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg. 
Hsu, F.-H., Wang, C.-S., Hsu, C.-H., Tso, C.-K., Chen, L.-H., & Lin, S.-H. (2014). Detect fast-flux domains 
through response time differences. Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, 32(10), 
1947-1956.  
Huang, S.-Y., Mao, C.-H., & Lee, H.-M. (2010). Fast-flux service network detection based on spatial 
snapshot mechanism for delay-free detection. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 5th 
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, Beijing, China.  
ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC). (March 2008). SSAC Advisory on Fast Flux 
Hosting and DNS, Fast and Double Flux Attacks.  
Inc, T. E.-T. M. (Online). New Zeus Gameover Employs DGA and Fast Flux Techniques.  
Jeong, Y.-S., Kang, I.-H., Jeong, M.-K., & Kong, D. (2012). A new feature selection method for one-class 
classification problems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C 
(Applications and Reviews), 42(6), 1500-1509.  
122 
 
Jiang, N., Cao, J., Jin, Y., Li, L. E., & Zhang, Z.-L. (2010). Identifying suspicious activities through dns failure 
graph analysis. Paper presented at the Network Protocols (ICNP), 2010 18th IEEE International 
Conference on. 
Kalige, E., Burkey, D., & Director, I. (2012). A case study of eurograbber: How 36 million euros was 
stolen via malware. Versafe (White paper).  
Karasaridis, A., Rexroad, B., & Hoeflin, D. (2007). Wide-scale botnet detection and characterization. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the first conference on First Workshop on Hot Topics in 
Understanding Botnets. 
Kasabov, N., Dhoble, K., Nuntalid, N., & Indiveri, G. (2013). Dynamic evolving spiking neural networks 
for on-line spatio-and spectro-temporal pattern recognition. Neural Networks, 41, 188-201.  
Kira, K., & Rendell, L. A. (1992). The feature selection problem: Traditional methods and a new 
algorithm. Paper presented at the Aaai. 
Koo, T.-M., Chang, H.-C., & Chuang, C.-C. (2012). Detecting and Analyzing Fast-Flux Service Networks. 
Advances in Information Sciences & Service Sciences, 4(10).  
Kwon, J., Lee, J., Lee, H., & Perrig, A. (2016). PsyBoG: A scalable botnet detection method for large-
scale DNS traffic. Computer Networks, 97, 48-73. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.12.008 
Lee, W., & Stolfo, S. J. (2000). A framework for constructing features and models for intrusion detection 
systems. ACM transactions on Information and system security (TiSSEC), 3(4), 227-261.  
Levy, E., & Arce, I. (2006). A Short Visit to the Bot Zoo. IEEE Security & Privacy, vol, 76-79.  
Lin, H.-T., Lin, Y.-Y., & Chiang, J.-W. (2013). Genetic-based real-time fast-flux service networks 
detection. Computer Networks, 57(2), 501-513. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2012.07.017 
Lin, Z., Ma, D., Meng, J., & Chen, L. (2018). Relative ordering learning in spiking neural network for 
pattern recognition. Neurocomputing, 275, 94-106.  
Mandal, S. K. (2017). Performance Analysis Of Data Mining Algorithms For Breast Cancer Cell Detection 
Using Naïve Bayes, Logistic Regression and Decision Tree. International Journal Of Engineering 
And Computer Science, 6(2).  
Martinez-Bea, S., Castillo-Perez, S., & Garcia-Alfaro, J. (2013). Real-time malicious fast-flux detection 
using DNS and bot related features. Paper presented at the PST. 
Matthews, B. W. (1975). Comparison of the predicted and observed secondary structure of T4 phage 
lysozyme. Biochimica et Biophysica Acta (BBA) - Protein Structure, 405(2), 442-451. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-2795(75)90109-9 
Nuntalid, N., Dhoble, K., & Kasabov, N. (2011). EEG classification with BSA spike encoding algorithm 
and evolving probabilistic spiking neural network. Paper presented at the Neural information 
processing. 
Otgonbold, T. (2014). ADAPT: An anonymous, distributed, and active probing-based technique for 
detecting malicious fast-flux domains.  
Pa, Y. M. P., Yoshioka, K., & Matsumoto, T. (2015). Detecting malicious domains and authoritative name 
servers based on their distinct mappings to IP addresses. Journal of information processing, 
23(5), 623-632.  
Pappas, V., Wessels, D., Massey, D., Lu, S., Terzis, A., & Zhang, L. (2009). Impact of configuration errors 
on DNS robustness. Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, 27(3), 275-290.  
Passerini, E., Paleari, R., Martignoni, L., & Bruschi, D. (2008). Fluxor: Detecting and monitoring fast-flux 
service networks Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment (pp. 186-
206): Springer. 
123 
 
Paul, T., Tyagi, R., Manoj, B., & Thanudas, B. (2014). Fast-flux botnet detection from network traffic. 
Paper presented at the India Conference (INDICON), 2014 Annual IEEE. 
Perdisci, R., Corona, I., Dagon, D., & Lee, W. (2009). Detecting malicious flux service networks through 
passive analysis of recursive dns traces. Paper presented at the Computer Security Applications 
Conference, 2009. ACSAC'09. Annual. 
Perdisci, R., Corona, I., Dagon, D., & Wenke, L. (2009, 7-11 Dec. 2009). Detecting Malicious Flux Service 
Networks through Passive Analysis of Recursive DNS Traces. Paper presented at the Computer 
Security Applications Conference, 2009. ACSAC '09. Annual. 
Perdisci, R., Corona, I., & Giacinto, G. (2012). Early detection of malicious flux networks via large-scale 
passive DNS traffic analysis. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 9(5), 
714-726.  
Pharmacy, F. c. C. (Online).  
Qassrawi, M. T., & Zhang, H. L. (2012). Detecting Malicious Fast Flux Domains. Paper presented at the 
Applied Mechanics and Materials. 
Rajab, M. A., Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., & Terzis, A. (2006). A multifaceted approach to understanding the 
botnet phenomenon. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM 
conference on Internet measurement, Rio de Janeriro, Brazil.  
Scharrenberg, P. (2008). Analyzing Fast-Flux Service Networks. Diploma Dissertation, RWTH Aachen 
University, Aachen, North Rhine Westphalia, Germany.  
Schliebs, S., & Kasabov, N. (2013). Evolving spiking neural network—a survey. Evolving Systems, 4(2), 
87-98.  
Semantec. (2018). Internet security threat report  
Shaikh, A., Tewari, R., & Agrawal, M. (2001). On the effectiveness of DNS-based server selection. Paper 
presented at the INFOCOM 2001. Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer 
and Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE. 
Sheng, Y., Shijie, Z., & Sha, W. (2010, 25-27 June 2010). Fast-flux attack network identification based 
on agent lifespan. Paper presented at the Wireless Communications, Networking and 
Information Security (WCNIS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on. 
Soltic, S., & Kasabov, N. (2010). Knowledge extraction from evolving spiking neural networks with rank 
order population coding. International Journal of Neural Systems, 20(06), 437-445.  
Spamwiki., C. P.-. (Online).   Retrieved from 
http://spamtrackers.eu/wiki/index.php/Canadian_Pharmacy 
Stalmans, E., Hunter, S. O., & Irwin, B. (2012, 15-17 Aug. 2012). Geo-spatial autocorrelation as a metric 
for the detection of Fast-Flux botnet domains. Paper presented at the Information Security for 
South Africa (ISSA), 2012. 
Stone-Gross, B., Cova, M., Cavallaro, L., Gilbert, B., Szydlowski, M., Kemmerer, R., . . . Vigna, G. (2009). 
Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover. Paper presented at the Proceedings of 
the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. 
Stornig, F. (2013). Detection of Botnet Fast-Flux Domains by the aid of spatial analysis methods.  
Su, M.-Y., & Tsai, C.-H. (2012). A prevention system for spam over Internet telephony. Appl. Math, 
6(2S), 579S-585S.  
Swets, J. A. (2014). Signal detection theory and ROC analysis in psychology and diagnostics: Collected 
papers: Psychology Press. 
Villamarín-Salomón, R., & Brustoloni, J. C. (2009). Bayesian bot detection based on DNS traffic 
similarity. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied 
Computing. 
Vu Hong, L. (2012). DNS Traffic Analysis for Network-based Malware Detection.  
124 
 
Xu, W., Wang, X., & Xie, H. (2013). New Trends in FastFlux Networks. media. blackhat. com.  
Yu, B., Smith, L., & Threefoot, M. (2014). Semi-supervised Time Series Modeling for Real-Time Flux 
Domain Detection on Passive DNS Traffic. In P. Perner (Ed.), Machine Learning and Data Mining 
in Pattern Recognition (Vol. 8556, pp. 258-271): Springer International Publishing. 
Yu, S. (2014). Malicious Networks for DDoS Attacks Distributed Denial of Service Attack and Defense 
(pp. 15-29): Springer. 
Yu, X., Zhang, B., Kang, L., & Chen, J. (2012). Fast-Flux Botnet Detection Based on Weighted SVM. 
Information Technology Journal, 11(8), 1048.  
Zhao, D., & Traore, I. (2012). P2P botnet detection through malicious fast flux network identification. 
Paper presented at the P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Computing (3PGCIC), 2012 
Seventh International Conference on. 
Zhao, Y., & Jin, Z. (2015). Quickly Identifying FFSN Domain and CDN Domain with Little Dataset.  
Zheng, B., Yoon, S. W., & Lam, S. S. (2014). Breast cancer diagnosis based on feature extraction using a 
hybrid of K-means and support vector machine algorithms. Expert Systems with Applications, 
41(4), 1476-1482.  
Zhou, C. V., Leckie, C., & Karunasekera, S. (2009). Collaborative detection of fast flux phishing domains. 
Journal of Networks, 4(1), 75-84.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Dataset and code samples 
 
Sample of the feature file: 
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Code in python for extract feature from the dataset: 
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Classifier code in python (DeSNN): 
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Initial weight code based on Spiketime: 
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